A Stranger to its Laws: Homosexuality, Schemas, and the Lessons and Limits of Reasoning by Analogy by Brower, Todd
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 38 | Number 1 Article 2
1-1-1997
A Stranger to its Laws: Homosexuality, Schemas,
and the Lessons and Limits of Reasoning by
Analogy
Todd Brower
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Todd Brower, A Stranger to its Laws: Homosexuality, Schemas, and the Lessons and Limits of Reasoning by Analogy, 38 Santa Clara L.
Rev. 65 (1997).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss1/2
"A STRANGER TO ITS LAWS:" HOMOSEXUALITY,
SCHEMAS, AND THE LESSONS AND LIMITS OF
REASONING BY ANALOGY
Todd Brower*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Romer v. Evans,' the Supreme Court struck down
Amendment 2 to the Colorado constitution, which prohibited
state protection of lesbians and gay men2 from discrimina-
tion, because it was class legislation violating the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 The Court re-
Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law, Fullerton,
California; A.B. 1976, Princeton University; J.D. 1980, Stanford University;
LL.M. 1990, Yale University. I wish to express my gratitude for the helpful
suggestions and support of several people, most notable, Scott Terry, Aaron
Brower, Neil Gotanda, and Edith Warkentine.
1. Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
2. The author uses the terms "lesbians" and "gay men" when referring to
women and men whose sexual orientation is same-sex and gay when referring
to same-sex persons generally. By doing so, the author wishes to illustrate that
the experience of same-sex orientation is often, but not exclusively mediated by
gender. Accord Marc Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytel-
ling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians And Gay Men,
46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 535-36 (1992). Moreover, the term "homosexual" car-
ries connotations that same-sex orientation is primarily about sex, one of the
dominant, misleading characteristics of the gay schema. Although some com-
mentators and segments of the gay community employ the term "queer," this
article does not. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tom-
boys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender" and "Sexual Orientation"
in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 n.2, 347-49 (1995); Dan
Levy, A New Generation Bending the Rules: Young Gays, Lesbians Shed the
Old Labels, S.F. CHRON., April 28, 1994, at Al, A.
Studies have shown that it is probably more accurate to refer to
"homosexualities," as there is a diverse continuum of same-sex orientations.
See, e.g., ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY OF
DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN, 53-61 (1978); ALFRED KINSEY, ET AL.
SExuAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE, 636-55 (1948); see also, Janet Halley,
Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick,
79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1723 (1993). Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, this
article uses the term in the singular. Finally, the author avoids using the term
"straight" to characterize heterosexuals or heterosexuality, as that term implies
that lesbian and gay males are crooked or deviant. See Fajer, supra note 2, at
536 n. 119.
3. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
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jected the argument that Colorado merely denied special
rights to its gay citizens and found "nothing special in the
protections Amendment 2 withholds." The Court stated,
"These are protections taken for granted by most people ei-
ther because they already have them or do not need them;
these are protections against exclusion from an almost limit-
less number of transactions and endeavors that constitute
ordinary civic life in a free society."4 The Court concluded
that Amendment 2 classified lesbians and gay men, not to
further a proper legislative purpose, but to make them une-
qual to everyone else. In so doing, the state had impermissi-
bly made them "a stranger to its laws."5
Despite the Supreme Court's rejection in Romer, the
treatment of gay people as separate (and unequal)6 and their
consequent exclusion from legal protections, is a persistent
feature of much current legal doctrine. Too often, the fact
that a case involves lesbians and gay men causes an inability
to see beyond that particular issue. An important component
of the study of case precedent and reasoning by analogy is the
ability to recognize when things are meaningfully similar or
dissimilar and to treat them accordingly.! As gay rights is-
sues proliferate in the courts,8 however, judges and lawyers
seem to have forgotten how to determine similarity and dif-
ference. ' Cases that are otherwise similar are decided differ-
4. Id. at 1627.
5. Id.
6. This word choice is deliberate. The Court in Romer recognized the emo-
tional connotations of a reference to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623; see infra notes 107-116 and accompanying text.
Moreover, it also appreciated the legal consequences of gay people being treated
as separate or different from the majority. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1625, 1627.
7. E.g., MARILYN WALTER ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 32-
33 (Foundation Press 1995); cf. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2295 (1997)
(arguing the Equal Protection clause "embodies a general rule that States must
treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly").
8. In addition to Romer, decided in 1997, and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Oncale v. Offshore
Servs., Inc, 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3814 (Jun. 9,
1997) dealing with same sex sexual harassment. See also infra Part IV. As
Newsweek magazine put it, in modern American life, homosexuality has gone
"from 'the love that dare not speak its name' to 'the love that won't shut up."'
Jonathan Alter, Degrees of Discomfort, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 12, 1990, at 27.
9. Cf. Gina Torrielli, Protecting the Nontraditional Couple in Times of
Medical Crises, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 220, 229 (1989) ("One of the greatest
hurdles for enforcement of unwritten contracts [between lesbians and gay male
couples] may be the practical problem of persuading a judge unfamiliar with
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ently when they involve lesbians and gay men.
This phenomenon is less puzzling than it appears at first
glance. Psychologists have demonstrated that our percep-
tions of the world are shaped by schemas-a set of beliefs
about people, events or situations that we use as guides in
our interaction with these things. ° Having a schema about a
person or thing enables us to know (or believe we know) a
great deal about that person or thing in a shorthand fashion.
Thus, we are able to treat that object or person in what we
perceive to be an appropriate manner; that is, consistent with
our schema."
For example, if we have a schema about chairs, we may
have a pre-defined set of attributes for those objects: they
have legs and a seat; they have support for our backs; they
may or may not have arms; they are used to sit on; etc. Thus,
we can accommodate a wide variety of chairs, from desk-
chairs, to recliners, to rocking chairs, because we have fit
them into our schema. If we are faced with a novel object, for
example a beanbag chair, we test the limits of our schema. If
the gay community that lesbian and gay couples enter committed relationships
and may expect support from each other.").
10. E.g., AARON BROWER & PAULA NURIUS, SOCIAL COGNITION AND IN-
DIVIDUAL CHANGE: CURRENT THEORY AND COUNSELING GUIDELINES 14-15
(1993). There is an extensive psychology literature on schema theory. Id.;
Nancy Cantor & John F. Kihlstrom, Mental Representations of the Self, in 17
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1-44 (L. Berkowitz, ed.
1984); NANCY CANTOR & JOHN F. KIHLSTROM, PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL
INTELLIGENCE (1989); Claudia E. Cohen, Goals and Schemata in Person Percep-
tion: Making Sense from the Stream of Behavior, in PERSONALITY, COGNITION,
AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 45 (Nancy Cantor & John F. Kihlstrom eds.,1981);
M.R. Gottfried & D. Robins, Self Schemata, Cognitive Bias and the Processing
of Therapeutic Experiences, in ADVANCES IN COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
AND THERAPY 33, 33-39 (P.C. Kendall ed., 1983); E.J. LANGER, MINDFULNESS
(1989); David Meichenbaum, "Cognitive Behavior Modification," in HELPING
PEOPLE CHANGE: A TEXTBOOK OF METHODS 346 (Frederick H. Kanfer & Arnold
P. Goldstein eds., 3d ed. 1986); K. Stein, Complexity of Self-Schema and Re-
sponses to Disconfirming Feedback, 18 COGNITIVE THERAPY AND RESEARCH 161,
161 (1994); J. Bransford et al., Teaching Thinking and Problem Solving, 41 AM.
PSYCHOL. 1078-89 (1986); A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124-31 (1974); A. Tversky & D. Kah-
neman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency Probability, 5
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
Other commentators have employed relatively similar constructs, without
the same basis in empirical studies: Anthony Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty
Law Practice: Learning Lessons in Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2123-
24 (1991) ("pre-understanding"); Fajer, supra note 2, at 524-25; Gerald Lopez,
Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3, 5 (1984) ("stock story").
11. See BROWER & NURIUS, supra note 10, at 14.
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the key component of "chair" is its function, and we can sit in
beanbag furniture, our chair schema will adapt to accept this
object and treat a beanbag chair consistently with other
chairs. Moreover, if our chair schema includes beanbags, we
already know a great deal about that object, its use, where it
belongs in a house, whether it is an appropriate plaything for
children, etc. Conversely, if our chair schema primarily re-
quires legs, we will resist incorporating the beanbag as a
chair, resist its intended function, and resist treating it like
other chairs.
Similarly, we interact with people in a manner consis-
tent with our social schemas. We develop schemas which as-
cribe a range of characteristics to others corresponding to
skin color, 2 sex,1" and other physical attributes. 4 It is unsur-
prising, therefore, that people have a schema for lesbians and
gay men and for homosexuality. We can quickly identify
some characteristics of the popular schema about gay peo-
ple."6 First, one such characteristic is that gay identity is
12. See generally Kenneth Clark & Mamie Clark, Racial Identification and
Preference in Negro Children, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (T. New-
comb et al. eds., 1947). There is an extensive legal literature about race and
racial perceptions. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of Our Constitution is
Colorblind, 44 STAN. L. REV. (1991); Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987).
13. See e.g., Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Cul-
ture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L REP. 175 (1982). This article
distinguishes between "sex" and "gender." In this article, 'sex" refers to bio-
logical differences between men and women; "gender" denotes cultural or so-
cially constructed characteristics associated with men or women. See J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 156 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Gender Is for Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 982 (1992). Thus,
menstruation exemplifies a sex difference, the differing perception of a woman
or a man in a dress illustrates a gender one.
14. David Stipp, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who's the Fairest of Them All?,
FORTUNE, Sept. 9, 1996, at 87 (describing the conclusions of a 1990 University
of Pittsburgh study finding that businessmen's average yearly salary rose
$1,300.00 per inch of height-a six foot man made $6,500.00 more in salary
than one who was five feet, seven inches, and other studies of the correlation
between physical attractiveness and success).
15. Professor Marc Fajer also pointed to the significance of these issues.
See Fajer, supra note 2, at 514, 607.
There are, of course, a whole host of other aspects of the lesbians and gay
male schema not directly relevant to the legal doctrines discussed in this arti-
cle. For example, gay men are supposed to be more artistic, creative or stylish
than non-gay men. See, e.g., Cheers episode in which Norm (George Wendt), in
order to meet clients' expectations, pretends to be gay to obtain a job as an inte-
rior designer. Cheers, (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 8, 1988); George F. Cus-
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about sex. Lesbians and gay men experience sexuality and
sexual activity different from heterosexuals. Homosexuality,
according to the schema, is omni-present, uncontrollable, and
predatory. Sex is completely divorced from love, long-term
relationships and family structures,"6 all of which form part
of the schema for heterosexuality. 7 A second characteristic is
that lesbians and gay men exhibit "cross-gender" or gender
atypical behavior-behavior traditionally associated with the
opposite sex." These aspects of the schema attached to lesbi-
ans and gay men leave their traces in legal doctrine, as many
judges are unable to apply relevant legal precedent when gay
persons and issues are involved.
Some of the most glaring examples have occurred under
the sex discrimination prohibitions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.' 9 Judges have refused to equate same-sex
sexual harassment with cross-sex harassment." When a
man harasses a woman, Title VII applies; when he harasses
another man, it does not.2' Moreover, although courts recog-
nize a Title VII cause of action against an employer when he22
requires conformity to traditional gender behavior for
women;" no equivalent suit is permitted by an effeminate
man, because gender-atypicality is conflated with homosexu-
ality.
24
More broadly, homosexuality appears to inhibit proper
application of precedent and reasoning by analogy when it
ten, Strange Brew: Hollywood and the Fabrication of Homosexuality, in QUEER
REPRESENTATIONS, 119 n.9 (Martin Duberman ed., 1997) (discussing newspa-
pers' accounts of Cole Porter being the interior decorator for his (and his wife's)
apartment and his general sense of style as codedly identifying him as gay).
16. Accord Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) ("No connec-
tion between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual
activity on the other has been demonstrated .... Moreover, any claim that
these cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that any kind of private sex-
ual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state
proscription is unsupportable.").
17. Fajer, supra note 2 at 514.
18. Fajer, supra note 2 at 607.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (1994).
20. E.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 1994);
Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 695 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D. Ill. 1988).
21. Compare Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), with
Garcia, 28 F.3d at 446.
22. Although employers can be men, women, or genderless business organi-
zations, this Article uses the masculine pronoun to refer to all employers.
23. E.g.. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
24. E.g., Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992); Smith v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
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comes to larger social issues, such as child custody, the legal
definition of family, and same-sex marriage. As commenta-
tors have pointed out, the arguments against same-sex mar-
riage today are strongly reminiscent of those formerly mar-
shaled against interracial marriage." However, if one's
schema of lesbians and gay men is that their couplings are
simply about sex and are not love relationships,26 it is unre-
25. See James Trosino, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the
Anti-Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93, 93 (1993).
26. Even non-sexual meetings of lesbian and gay men are assumed to be
sexual. See Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1323 (5th
Cir. 1984) (discussing expert testimony that sex certainly followed any meeting
of lesbian and gay male services organization); cf 142 Cong. Rec. S. 9998, 104th
Cong, 2d Sess. (Fri. Sept. 6, 1996) (remarks of Senator Nickles (R-Okla.) on the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act ("ENDA"), Senate Bill 2056, which would
have amended Title VII to add sexual orientation as a prohibited category).
Senator Nickles stated,
In my days as an employer, I had a sales force. Sales people spend a
lot of time together. They go on the road together. They travel to-
gether. They go to conventions together. They spend weeks together.
What if an employer found out this person is a good salesman, has a
good reputation, but he openly admits that he is bisexual. Now, that
may be fine in some sales organizations but in some other sales organi-
zations it will not be very popular. It will not be very popular. It will
not be very popular with some of the spouses, maybe male and female.
If an employer says, "Well, no, that person really will not fit into our
organization. We do not think we should have promiscuous people in
our sales team because of the time spent away from home, the time
and travel, so I think that as a policy we will not do that." You say,
"Wait a minute, this bill does not protect that. Wait a minute, this bill
protects homosexuals and bisexuals." The very definition of bisexual
means you are promiscuous. You are having sex with males and fe-
males. Bisexuals are protected under this bill.
Id.
The structure of Senator Nickles' logic is telling in several ways. The Bill
protects bisexuals and homosexuals. Bisexuals, by definition, are attracted to
both men and women. Consequently, they can never be satisfied with just once
person, male or female. Therefore, they must be promiscuous, since no matter
who they are with, they always want other sexual partners of the other sex.
Moreover, they will seek these partners in the workplace, at the expense of
other workers' marriages or commitments. The leap of logic in these last three
sentences is enormous, until we remember that only heterosexuals have rela-
tionships based on love and family. Under Senator Nickles' schema, there is no
notion of fidelity, selectivity, or even self-control in bisexuality. A bisexual
must have these sexual urges and act on them indiscriminately.
Moreover, even if we accept his premise as to bisexuality, he would appear
to then be arguing for an exclusion of only bisexuals from ENDA's anti-
discrimination provisions. Logically, gay persons and non-gay persons alike are
capable of fidelity since they are attracted to only one sex. His inferred place-
ment of lesbians and gay men together with bisexuals is in contradistinction to
non-gay persons. Thus, it illustrates that his schema of lesbians and gay men
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markable that cases dealing with family, traditional relation-
ships, or close emotional bonds are shunted aside as inappo-
site to gay relationships.27 The gay identity as sex portion of
the lesbian and gay male schema forms one of the bases un-
derlying the different perspectives in the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Romer v. Evans.28
Accordingly, this article takes a fresh look at Title VII
and other jurisprudence which have been obscured by the
distorting schemas of homosexuality in order to untangle
faulty reasoned opinions. Part II discusses schema theory,29
which is then illustrated in a discussion of Romer v. Evans
and other doctrinal areas in Part III.30 Part IV continues the
application of schema theory to persistent problems under Ti-
tle VII's prohibition of sex discrimination."' Finally, Part V
suggests that cognitive psychology schema research may pro-
vide insight not only into the roots of faulty legal reasoning,
but also into techniques to correct it. 2
II. SCHEMAS AND LESBIANS AND GAY MEN
Current research in social cognition reveals that people
store information about themselves and the world in the form
of schemas-cognitive representations of events, objects and
concepts.3 Thus, when we reason by analogy, or learn from
past experiences, we actually refer to our ability to extract
meaning from our interactions with our environment or from
cases, and apply those understandings to novel situations.
We apply schemas developed from extracted information to
make sense of these future events and cases.34
Schemas are cognitive images that-enable us to classify a
also excludes fidelity, selectivity, and self-control.
27. See, e.g., SASHA LEWIS, SUNDAYS WOMEN: A REPORT ON LESBIAN LIFE,
116 (1979) (discussing an Ohio judge who denied a lesbian mother custody of
her children saying, "[o]rgasm means more to [lesbians] than children or any-
thing else"); Opinion of James S. Gilmore, III Att'y Gen. of Va., 1994 Va. A.G.
LEXIS 21 (July 22, 1994) (statute on domestic violence does not apply to homo-
sexual co-habitants); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. App. 1974)
("There can be no doubt that there exists a rational basis for the state to limit
the definition of marriage to exclude same-sex relationships.").
28. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
29. See discussion infra Part II.
30. See discussion infra Part III.
31. See discussion infra Part IV.
32. See discussion infra Part V.
33. Claudia E. Cohen, supra note 10, at 49
34. CANTOR & KIHLSTROM, supra note 10, at 108-14.
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lot of information in compact paradigms, by using prototypi-
cal features. We extract and retain certain information be-
cause it is useful to us and consonant with our schema for
that concept, and reject information when it is inconsistent or
no longer useful.35 We liberally edit information to fit a par-
ticular schema, and, as all schemas are idiosyncratic, it is
neither necessarily accurate nor consistent with another's
schema of the same thing.36
As applied to people or to social situations, schemas in-
form us as to what is appropriate and how to act. For exam-
ple, when we enter a restaurant, we call upon our
"restaurant" schema that helps us delineate our expectations
or behavior. Thus, we know when to wait for a table, how to
signal the waiter, where and how to pay the check. These
schemas are socially or culturally based. As anyone who has
traveled in foreign countries can recognize, the American res-
taurant schema is not necessarily applicable or useful as a
guide to ordering coffee in a caf6 in Rome,37 or figuring out
how to leave a tip in Bonn.38 Reasoning by analogy, or
schema, is sometimes inapposite.
Moreover, blindly following an inappropriate schema can
lead to unanticipated consequences. Carrying a beverage or-
dered at the bar to a table at a caf6 may be consistent with
U.S. restaurant schemas, but is dramatically violative of
French ones, where location signifies a price and behavior
difference.39 A person who did so would be viewed as igno-
rant or perhaps as trying to get away with something to
which he or she would not be entitled. In a similar fashion,
following inappropriate schemas or legal precedent can lead
to equally erroneous decisions. For example, the nineteenth
35. BROWER & NURIUS, supra note 10, at 14.
36. Id. at 14-15. For an interesting essay examining how historians' "plots"
affect their narratives of environmental history by a process similar to schema
theory, see William Cronon, A Place For Stories: Nature, History, and Narra-
tive, J. AM. HIST. 1347, 1347-67 (1992) (describing the different histories of the
Great Plains generated from the same historical evidence).
37. See, MARIO COSTANTINO & LAWRENCE GAMBELLO, THE ITALIAN WAY 6
(1996) (describing the practice of going to the cashier and paying for the order,
then presenting the receipt (scontino) to the barman to receive the coffee); RICK
STEVE, RICK STEVE'S ITALY 21 (1997).
38. See, RICHARD LORD, CULTURE SHOCK-GERMANY, 184-85 (1996)
(describing the custom of handing the tip directly to the server, rather than
leaving it on the table, or having it included on the credit card slip).
39. See, e.g., DAVID APPLEFIELD, PARIS INSIDE OUT 326 (1994).
[Vol. 38
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century schema of woman as wife and mother was central to
the Illinois Supreme Court's decision to prohibit the admis-
sion of female attorneys to the state bar in Bradwell v. Illi-
nois.4" This same view was shared by at least three justices
of the United States Supreme Court; Justices Bradley,
Swayne, and Field stated that the natural role of women
made them unfit for work outside the home.4'
Social schemas causes us to catalog people or legal prob-
lems in a short amount of time. As we encounter a person or
an issue of first impression, we enlist schemas to register ap-
propriate responses. The schema inclines us to attribute a
range of beliefs, based on those schemas, to a person or event,
to which we attach subsequent interpretations consonant
with those impressions. For instance, our "good student"
schema informs us that a person who gets good grades, is
prepared for class, writes and speaks well. We may also at-
tach negative characteristics to an otherwise positive schema;
a good student may also signify socially inept or syncopantic.
We may anchor feelings and emotions to that schema. If we
see friendliness as a component of good student, we will feel
friendly towards someone who is a good student. Conjointly,
if we are feeling friendly towards someone, it is easier to per-
ceive that person as a good student.42 Further, we may as-
cribe gender or ethnic characteristics to our schemas, so that
maleness or Asian-Americanness 43 is associated with good
student.
Schemas have both positive and negative functions.
Schemas are crucial to our ability to function in the world. If
we had to constantly analyze each piece of information, event
40. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 132 (1872) (quoting from the
Illinois Supreme Court's opinion).
41. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). Justice Bradley wrote that the
natural role of women was as wives and mothers, positions inconsistent with a
separate career as a lawyer. Id. Because his schema of women was restricted
to these roles, he viewed the state's prohibition as not only consistent with
family harmony and civil society, but with God and nature as well. Of course,
the fact that both the schema and the decision were widely accepted at the time
shows that schemas are deeply rooted in their time and culture. Accord In re
Lavinia Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 246 (Wis. 1875) (certain conversation in court not
fit for women's ears, therefore, admitting women to the bar would ruin public
decency and propriety).
42. BROWER & NuRius, supra note 10, at 14.
43. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Choosing Sides: After Approval of a Ban by
the University of California Regents, Asian-Americans Face Yet Another Divide,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1996, § 4A, at 26.
19971
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or situation anew, we would either be paralyzed into inactiv-
ity or overwhelmed by minutia. Schemas, therefore, are one
way to process the incessant stream of demands and inputs.44
They permit us to understand others or new situations and to
interact successfully with them after only an initial encoun-
ter. Further, this process occurs semi-automatically, with a
relative lack of awareness.45 We sort and classify information
through schemas with little recognition of the fact that this
triage is taking place.
On the other hand, we can employ schemas to blind our-
selves to the reality of others, events, or concepts. We may,
and often do, enlist inappropriate or inaccurate schemas, and
thus make false analogies or distinctions, beginning a jour-
ney of erroneously anticipating and interpreting events and
legal precedent.
Traditional legal reasoning by analogy follows this
schema pattern. We apply precedent to the circumstances
before us when a prior case is consistent with our under-
standing of the instant situation. Moreover, we conclude that
the situations are congruent when our schema of one factual
or legal pattern resonates with the other. Thus, a judge or
legal scholar need not reanalyze each problem from scratch
each time she encounters a new situation, but can rely on
prior cases and doctrine. Of course, we are consciously ap-
plying precedent to make decisions. However, the processes
of decision-making are often obscured or misattributed."6
More specifically, the mechanics of schematic thinking
correspond to legal analysis of precedent. Schema theory
posits that people make decisions by prototype matching or
representativeness heuristics. People rarely think logically
about whether a person or situation falls into a particular
category or analog. They do not methodically run through a
checklist of relevant characteristics and rigorously compare
the novel person or situation to their prototype or schema.
Rather, they heuristically compare the person or situation be-
fore them with a prototype and classify the new person or
44. BROWER & NURIUS, supra note 10, at 28.
45. Id.; see generally, E.J. LANGER, MINDFULNESS (1989).
46. That a judge may base her decisions on other inputs than pure legal
doctrine was one of the insights of the legal realist movement of the 1930's.
See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, 148-55 (Tudor Pub-
lishing CO., 1936). Critical Legal Studies often makes a similar point. See, e.g.,
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, 200-04 (1987).
[Vol. 38
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situation with reference to how representative it appears of
their prototype.47 For example, we holistically recognize
when an object is a chair. We usually do not rigorously com-
pare that object to a list of all the characteristics associated
with chairs, and then reach an explicitly reasoned conclusion.
Despite the belief that legal analysis requires carefully
reasoned, rational decision-making,48 we should, therefore,
expect to find examples of prototype-matching in jurispru-
dence as well. For example, Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion in Romer v. Evans illustrates how this mechanism
operates in constitutional law.49 As the dissent pointed out,
the majority's opinion, holding that Amendment 2 lacks a ra-
tional relationship to legitimate state interests, did not re-
veal a rigorous analysis of past rational basis decisions or of
Colorado's asserted legitimate state interests.50  Rather, it
was a holistic statement based on the fundamentals of Equal
Protection.5 Justice Kennedy began by briefly summarizing
the Court's rational basis decisions and jurisprudence."
Next, the Court treated Amendment 2 as though it were far
removed from other Equal Protection cases,53 concluding "[ilt
is not in our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this
sort."" This law simply did not meet the majority's proto-
typical Equal Protection matter. The Court's opinion, charac-
terized by the dissent as "so long on emotive utterance and so
short on relevant legal citation,"5 is actually a rather unre-
markable example of legal prototype matching.
While perhaps puzzling to Justice Scalia, who attributes
the Court's opinion as taking sides in a culture war,56 the
Court's decision-making process should be familiar to consti-
47. See BROWER & NuRius, supra note 10, at 83-84, 86; Nancy Genero &
Nancy Cantor, Exemplar Prototypes and Clinical Diagnosis: Toward a Cogni-
tive Economy, 5 J. SOCIAL & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 59, 59-78 (1987).
48. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 258 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (describing the method by which the Supreme Court analyzes a
substantive Due Process case).
49. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623-29 (1996).
50. Id. at 1631-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. See, e.g., id., 116 S. Ct. at 1627-29.
52. Id. at 1627.
53. Id. "First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional
and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation." Id.
54. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
55. Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1627, 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tutional legal scholars examining fundamental liberties un-
der substantive due process.57 The Court typically articulates
a broad legal standard, looking for those fundamental liber-
ties "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"8 or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty such that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed."5 9 It
then compares the asserted right or liberty in the case before
it against standards and precedents in order to determine
whether the present case is like or unlike the prototype.
Note for example, the following statement from Roe v.
Wade:6  "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the
14th Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restric-
tions on state action or... in the 9th Amendment's reserva-
tion of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy.""1 Indeed, the same pattern, this time rejecting the
applicability of the paradigm to the instant situation, oc-
curred in the Court's other statement on gay issues, Bowers
v. Hardwick,2 discussing substantive due process. "[Wie
think it evident that none of the rights announced in those
cases bears any resemblance to the claimed right of homo-
sexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this
case" ... to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, face-
tious.,,64
Justice Stewart's famous definition of hard core obscen-
ity from Jacobellis v. Ohio, "I know it when I see it,"65 is a
more accurate assessment of legal and other reasoning than
non-cognitive psychologists might like to admit. The problem
57. This includes all the critical baggage that goes along with that process.
See generally, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE
AND BLUE (1989).
58. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (Powell, J.); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 506 (1965).
59. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61. Id. at 153.
62. 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
63. Id. at 190-91.
64. Id. at 194.
65. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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with this mode of analysis is not that he (or we) cannot rec-
ognize obscenity, fundamental liberties, sexual harassment,
or other legal concepts, but that our prototype may be idio-
syncratic-leading to inconsistent results.66 This heuristic
analytical mode may be both descriptive and normative for a
cognitive psychologist;67 it is not what constitutional scholars
traditionally require of jurisprudence.
Herein lies the crux of schema theory to this article. The
schema of lesbians and gay men used by most judges has
prevented them from appropriately interpreting legal doc-
trine and precedent, and has led to anomalous results.6
Moreover, the relatively non-rigorous nature of prototype-
matching, which is a feature of legal and non-legal reasoning,
has exacerbated this tendency toward inaccuracy and has
distorted legal doctrine where lesbians and gay men are in-
volved.
III. GAY IDENTITY AS SEX: FAMILY LAW AND ROMER V. EVANS
An important component of the erroneous lesbian and
gay male schema is that gay identity69 is solely a matter of
sex-meaning, what happens in the bedroom." Once judges
66. See generally, BROWER & NURIUS, supra note 10, at 82-83 (discussing
the pitfalls of schemas in the diagnosis and treatment of mental health clients).
67. See BROWER & NURIUS, supra note 10 at 84.
68. See Lawrence supra note 12, for a similar discussion in the context of
racial schemas. See Williams supra note 13, for a discussion of the way cultural
values limit and shape legal doctrines using gender.
69. There is a lively debate among scholars on whether there is a gay and
lesbian identity, and particularly whether one can properly use the terms les-
bian or gay man to describe persons engaged in same-sex sexual activity prior
to the mid nineteenth century. See, e.g., John Boswell, Revelations, Universals
and Sexual Categories, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY AND
LESBIAN PAST 17, 19-34 (Martin Duberman et al. eds., 1989); Joseph Cady,
"Masculine Love," Renaissance Writing, and the "New Invention" of Homosexu-
ality, 23 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 9 (1992). Fortunately, I have no need to take sides
in this debate as the thesis of this article does not depend on the correctness of
any one of these positions. In fact, as Professor Daniel Ortiz points out, there
may be no single definition of gay identity that can serve all purposes at all
times. Daniel Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism, Constructionism and
the Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1850 (1993).
70. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 27, at 11 which states:
Something that people don't understand is that it's not who you go to
bed with that determines if you're straight or gay. Sex has nothing to
do with it. You can be celibate and gay. Identification as gay or
straight is an emotional thing - do you relate primarily emotionally to
women or to men in an intimate situation? .... That was what was
missing in my marriage. Sex was okay with him. What was missing
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activate that element of the lesbian and gay male schema, a
number of misapplications occur.
One commentator stated that "[o]ne of the greatest hur-
dles for enforcement of unwritten contracts [between gay
couples] may be the practical problem of persuading a judge
unfamiliar with the gay community that lesbian and gay
couples enter committed relationships and may expect sup-
port from each other."'" The schema insists that a gay person
does not have relationships, but merely sexual encounters-
gay families are not real families. 2 Accordingly, the law has
rarely treated gay men and women as families. For example,
members of gay couples have not been able to use Virginia's
Domestic Violence statute7 3 to enjoin violence against their
cohabiting partners, even though the statute is not so lim-
ited.74 Additionally, courts sometimes refuse to enforce sup-
port obligations between cohabiting gay couples, finding
agreements in these relationships to be based on illicit mere-
tricious consideration.6 In Jones v. Daly,5 a California ap-
pellate court found that the use of the term "lovers" as part of
a gay couple's designation of their relationship, demonstrated
was the emotional intensity. I was never in love with him or with any
other man. I didn't know what "in love" meant until I had my first les-
bian relationship.
Id.
See generally, Fajer, supra note 2, at 537-70 (discussing the "sex as life-
style" assumption and lesbian and gay male counter-examples).
71. Torielli, supra note 9, at 229.
72. Cf. Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1584 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Starr, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (discussing homosexual relations and
the constitution: "It simply cannot be seriously maintained that the right of pri-
vacy extends ... beyond traditional relationships - the relationship of husband
and wife, or parents to children, or other close relationships .... ") (emphasis
added)); Lewis, supra note 27, at 116 (discussing an Ohio judge who denied a
lesbian mother custody of her children saying, "Orgasm means more to
[lesbians] than children or anything else.").
73. VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-57.2(A)-(C) (Michie 1994).
74. Opinion of James S. Gilmore III, Att'y Gen. of Va., 1994 Va. A.G. LEXIS
21 (July 22, 1994) (statute does not apply to homosexual co-habitants).
75. E.g., Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(rejecting, inter alia, gay male cohabitors' agreement for support because the
court found that use of the term, "lovers" demonstrated that the agreement was
based on sexual behavior, illicit meretricious consideration); Wharton v. Dil-
lingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 409-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (enforcing a cohabita-
tion agreement based on the value of services as bodyguard, chauffeur, social
and business secretary, real estate investment partner and counselor, and not
on the gay relationship which would have been illicit meretricious considera-
tion).
76. 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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that the agreement was built on sexual behavior 77-even
though "lover" is often used in the gay and lesbian commu-
nity as the equivalent of spouse."
Nor is the devaluation of gay relationships limited to
support and domestic violence statutes. Another example of
skewed legal doctrine and misapplication of legal precedent
will evidence the distorting effect of the lesbian and gay male
schema. In Palmore v. Sidotti,9 the Supreme Court held that
private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are
impermissible considerations in child custody determina-
tions."0 In this case, a White mother with custody of her
White child had remarried an African-American man. The
lower courts had taken custody away from the mother be-
cause "the wife has chosen for herself and her child, a life-
style unacceptable to the father and to society."8 Despite the
social disapproval of the relationship, the Supreme Court
stated that the potential for societal ostracism and the re-
sulting injury to the child was not a sufficient reason to
change custody from the mother to the father. 2 By recog-
nizing private prejudices in the courts, the state would be
putting its imprimatur on them in violation of the Constitu-
tion."
However, if the event that holds the potential for social
ostracism is the mother's lesbianism, most courts either fail
to recognize the parallels to Palmore or wrongly reject Pal-
more as inapposite precedent. Despite the obvious analogy to
Palmore, many courts find it consistent to treat the mother's
relationship with a person of the same sex in the same man-
ner as the mother's relationship with a person of a different
race, as treated by the trial court in Palmore."4 In S.E.G. v.
R.A.G.,"5 the Missouri court took custody of four minor chil-
dren from a lesbian mother because Union, Missouri was a
77. Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 132, 134.
78. See, e.g., Fajer, supra note 2, at 536-37. Although the term does not
necessarily have a single usage. Id. at 536 n.124.
79. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
80. Id. at 433-34.
81. Id. at 431.
82. Id. at 433.
83. Id.
84. To be sure the Supreme Court has not treated race and homosexuality
alike under the Constitution. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1631
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The two situations are parallel, if not identical.
85. 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
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small community where gays were not common [he believed]
nor openly accepted.86 Therefore, the court believed it needed
to protect the children from peer pressure, teasing and ostra-
cism.87  In S.E.G., the court misread Palmore as being
uniquely concerned with race discrimination.88 However,
other courts have followed Palmore and rejected societal in-
tolerance of the mother as a reason to change custody.89
Two facets of the S.E.G. court's opinion are striking. The
lesbian and gay male schema of gay relationships as divorced
from love, caring and stability ° influenced the court's view of
the relationship. The mother's behavior, which the court ap-
parently viewed as an egregious departure from propriety,
would be commonly accepted actions if a non-gay couple un-
dertook them.
Wife and lover show affection for each other in front of the
children. They sleep together in the same bed in the fam-
ily home in Union. When the wife and the four children
travel to St. Louis to see [lover], they also sleep together
there. All of these factors present an unhealthy environ-
ment for minor children.91
But for the sex of the partner, one might have assumed
that an affectionate relationship would have been a desirable
role model. The same conduct by a cross-sex couple would be
expected and would not be considered imposing behavior and
beliefs upon the community of Union. Lesbian and gay male
relationships are not supposed to exist, but if they do, they
need to be hidden away, shamefully, behind closed doors and
86. Id. at 166.
87. Id. at 165; accord Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995)
(citing Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (changing custody from les-
bian mother and female partner to child's maternal grandmother. "[L]iving
daily under conditions stemming from active lesbianism practiced in the home
may impose a burden on the child by reason of the 'social condemnation' at-
tached to such an arrangement, which will inevitably afflict the child's relation-
ship with its 'peers and with the community at large.'")).
88. S.E.G., 735 S.W.2d at 166.
89. Accord Pater v. Pater, 398, 588 N.E.2d 794, 799 (Ohio 1992) (rejecting a
change in custody from Jehovah's Witness mother, even if child would be ostra-
cized due to parent's religious beliefs and practices; following ruling in Palmore
v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)); e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 878 (Alaska
1985) (Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) applicable to reject social intoler-
ance of lesbianism as the reason to change custody from an otherwise fit
mother).
90. See supra notes 68-70 accompanying text.
91. S.E.G., 735 S.W.2d at 166.
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drawn curtains.92
Moreover, the S.E.G. court viewed this behavior as fla-
grant defiance of social convention and morality that merited
restrictions on visitation." The court's language echoes that
used by the lower Florida courts in Palmore.9" As the Court
stated in Palmore, "[Tihe wife has chosen for herself and her
child, a lifestyle unacceptable to the father and to society."95
As the court stated in S.E.G., "She [the mother] has chosen
not to make her sexual preference private but invites ac-
knowledgment and imposes her preference upon her children
and her community."96 Note the Florida court's use of the
word "lifestyle" to describe an interracial marriage.
"Lifestyle" is often used in the same deprecating way to trivi-
alize gay and lesbian relationships." This word choice re-
flects the inability of the speakers' schema of marriage to en-
compass interracial or same-sex relationships. The
strangeness to modern ears of the word "lifestyle," as applied
to interracial marriage, shows how the schema of marriage
has changed in a quarter century.98 That it does not sound
equally strange when applied to lesbians and gay men illus-
trates the ingrained nature of the schema that reduces gay
identity to sexual behavior. This reductionist view is an er-
ror.9" In short, like their non-gay counterparts, lesbians and
92. The phenomenon of keeping one's gay identity secret, being "in the
closet," is explored in EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTOMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET
(1990).
93. S.E.G., 735 S.W.2d at 167.
94. Compare S.E.G., 735 S.W.2d at 167, with Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S.
429, 331 (1984).
95. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added).
96. S.E.G., 735 S.W.2d at 167 (emphasis added).
97. See generally, Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1634 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
98. Changes in legal doctrine do not always lead to, or reflect, changes in
deeply held schemas. Early cases were filled with condemnation of interracial
marriage as unnatural and arguments that recall the modem debate on same-
sex marriage. See e.g., Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 194 (1877); Scott v. Geor-
gia., 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869) (laws prohibiting interracial marriages as part of a
divine plan); Trosino, supra note 25, at 108-111. Nevertheless, even as recently
as the early 1980's, as reflected in the trial court record in Palmore v. Sidotti,
466 U.S. 429 (1984), interracial relationships were still considered by some not
to be the equivalent of same-race marriages. This was some fifteen years after
the Supreme Court struck down anti-miscegenation statutes in Virginia as
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process
guarantees. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
99. See supra note 70. See generally, Fajer, supra note 2, at 537-70
(discussing the "sex as lifestyle" assumption and lesbian and gay male counter-
examples).
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gay men have relationships, not relations; lives, not life-
styles.
Note also the similarity between the two courts' view of
the mothers' relationships as "choices" or "preferences"
foisted upon their children and the world at large. °° De-
scribing the relationships as preferences devalues these rela-
tionships as mere predilections and reflects the schema of
lesbian and gay male identity as being purely sexual behav-
ior. If gay relationships are mere sexual couplings, it makes
sense to speak of choice. After all, one might legitimately
choose to be celibate or sexually active; one rarely speaks the
same way about choosing to fall in love.
Indeed, the schematic identification of gay people as de-
fined by their sexual activity has led to extreme results. Op-
ponents have dismissed student organizations designed to
provide support for lesbian and gay male students as mere
opportunities for sexual encounters."' A district court in
Texas upheld the denial of official university recognition for a
support group for lesbian and gay male students at Texas A
& M University based, in part, on expert testimony that sex-
ual activity would certainly take place at or shortly after
group meetings."2 The University had previously granted
recognition to a women's awareness group and a Black stu-
dents' awareness group, whose roles in the University com-
munity paralleled those proposed by the lesbian and gay
male organization. 13 Nevertheless, the University refused to
recognize the gay organization because it feared recognition
100. See infra notes 95, 96 and accompanying text.
101. Carol Ness, Stirring in the Heartland: Attitudes are Changing, But at a
Sometimes Glacial Pace, S.F. EXAM., June 24, 1996, at A6-7 (second of a seven
part series titled, Gay in America 1996) (Ron Mullins, head of the Modesto,
California, conservative, anti-gay Traditional Values Coalition, said that he op-
posed a high school group for gays because "all they want to do is have their lit-
tle meetings in schools so that they can have their liaisons, and that's not
right." "His view is that homosexuality is immoral, is all about sex. What
about love?"); Mike Thomas, Are Gay Rights A Civil Right?: David Caton Says
No, and He Wants Florida Voters to Close the Debate Forever, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 18, 1993, at 8, 10 (discussing one Florida minister who believes
that gay men want pro-gay laws passed so that they can "walk down the streets
jacking off." (quoting Rev. James Sykes)).
102. Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1323 (5th Cir.
1984) (describing testimony by University's expert that "it would be a shock
really, if there were not homosexual acts engaged in at or immediately after"
gay student group's meetings).
103. Id. at 1323 n.10.
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would lead to increased homosexual sexual conduct, in viola-
tion of the then existing Texas Penal Code. T'0 The Fifth Cir-
cuit correctly rejected this conflation, recognizing that there
is a difference between being a lesbian or gay man and en-
gaging in homosexual activity.'
The lesbian and gay male schema's reduction of gay and
lesbian identity to sexual conduct underlies a significant part
of the difference between the majority opinion and the dis-
sent in Romer v. Evans,10'6 the Supreme Court's most recent
decision involving gay people. The Court began its opinion
with Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson that the
Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens."'0° Thus, in starting with Plessy, the Court emphasized
that Colorado has attempted to treat certain of its citizens
differently from others on the basis of who they are, not on
their conduct.' 8 "Homosexuals, by state decree, are put into
a solitary class with respect to transactions and relations
both in the private and governmental spheres."' 9
Harlan's dissent in Plessy recognized the societal mean-
ing and the class-based animus behind the Louisiana statute
belying the formal equality of the law.
It was said in argument that the statute of Louisiana does
not discriminate against either race, but prescribes a rule
applicable alike to white and colored citizens. But this ar-
gument does not meet the difficulty. Every one knows
that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose,
not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars
occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from
coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons"'
104. Id. at 1320 n.4 (referring to a letter from the University Vice-President
for Student Affairs explaining the denial); id. at 1322 n.7 (discussing the trial
transcript).
105. Id. at 1328. Accord Ben-Sholom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp.
964, 975 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (recognizing this difference in the context of discharge
for violation of the military regulations against homosexual activity).
106. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1633 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1623 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 559 (1896)). Harlan's dissent in Plessy recognized the societal impact that
racial segregation had, rather than limit himself to formal equality of the con-
duct of riding in a segregated railway carriage. Id.
108. Other commenators have seen significance to Justice Kennedy's citation
to Plessy. E.g. Akhil Amar, Attainder and Amedment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95
MICH. L. REV. 203, 222 (1996).
109. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1625.
110. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 556-57 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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In contrast, Justice Brown's majority opinion viewed en-
forced separation in accommodations as mere reasonable
regulations of behavior or conduct in public places:
Laws permitting, and even requiring, [the races'] separa-
tion, in places where they are liable to be brought into con-
tact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race
to the other, and have been generally, if not universally,
recognized as within the competency of the state legisla-
tures in the exercise of their police powers."'
Any class-based denigration or badge of inferiority was the
product of Black self-perception, and not the law."2
Like Justice Harlan, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
in Romer recognized the societal meaning and class-based
animus of Amendment 2."' Accordingly, his opinion focused
on the effects of Amendment 2 on people-homosexuals. In
contrast, the dissent began by speaking about homosexual-
ity. "4 Viewing Amendment 2 as "class legislation" directed at
What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create
and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state
enactments which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens
are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in pub-
lic coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the
real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.
Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Perhaps the most striking part of Plessy to modern readers is the natural-
ness by which the majority and dissent assume a society hierarchically strati-
fied by race with Whites as the dominant class. See, e.g., id. at 559 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this coun-
try. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in
power. So I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its
great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.") This
naturalness of thought illustrates the schema of racial dominance underlying
American society of the period. CHARLES LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE 95-115
(1987).
111. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
112. Id. at 551 ("We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argu-
ment to consist of the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses
to put that construction upon it").
113. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627-28.
114. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) Scalia stated:
In holding that homosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable
treatment, the Court contradicts a decision, unchallenged here, pro-
nounced only 10 years ago, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), and places the prestige of this institution behind the proposi-
tion that opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or
religious bias .... This Court has no business.., pronouncing that
'animosity' against homosexuality.., is evil.
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unpopular persons is central to the Court's rejection of the
law as unconstitutional,"5 just as the core of the dissent's
perspective is that the law targets conduct or persons defined
The lesbian and gay male schema of gay identity as sex
permeates the dissent's view of Romer. Justice Scalia's lan-
guage rejecting the distinction between homosexuals and those
engaging in same-sex sexual activity for the purpose of the fa-
cial challenge to Amendment 2 is illuminating.
Some individuals of homosexual 'orientation' who do not engage in ho-
mosexual acts might successfully bring an as-applied challenge to
Amendment 2, but so far as the record indicates, none of the respon-
dents is such a person. See App. 4-5 (complaint describing each of the
individual respondents as either "a gay man" or "a lesbian")."
Justice Scalia's placement of quotation marks around
the word "orientation," in the first sentence appears to sig-
nify Justice Scalia's disbelief that gay or lesbian identity
exists apart from sexual activity. Moreover, the final sen-
tence of the quote clinches that assumption: a "gay man" or
"a lesbian" by definition, engages in same-sex sexual con-
duct. Significantly, this elision allows Justice Scalia to rea-
son about Amendment 2 and equate animosity or disfavor
against gay persons as though it were approbation solely on
the basis of sexual practices."8
Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1631-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf Amar, supra note 108, at 228
(arguing that Romer is implicitly based on attainder clause concerns and makes
a distinction between homosexual status and conduct).
117. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing to complaint de-
scribing each of the individual respondents as either 'a gay man' or 'a lesbian').
118. See, e.g., id. at 1633.
The Court's opinion contains grim, disapproving hints that Coloradans
have been guilty of "animus" or "animosity" toward homosexuality, as
though that had been established as Unamerican. Of course, it is our
moral heritage that one should not hate any human being or class of
human beings. But I had thought that one could consider certain con-
duct reprehensible-murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to
animals-and could exhibit even "animus" toward such conduct.
Surely that is the only sort of "animus" at issue here: moral disap-
proval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that
produced centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional in
Bowers.
Id. Of course, Justice Scalia has accused the majority of making the exact op-
posite conclusion.
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tutionality of Georgia's criminal sodomy statute,"9 Bowers v.
Hardwick .2
If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make
homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally
permissible for a State to enact laws merely disfavoring
homosexual conduct .... "If the Court [in Bowers] was
unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the be-
havior that defines the class, it is hardly open... to con-
clude that state sponsored discrimination against the class
is invidious. After all there can hardly be more palpable
discrimination against a class than making the conduct
that defines the class criminal."21
Of course, this application of Bowers to Romer is only
possible if gay identity is boiled down to sexual activity, of a
rather limited type. Bowers literally held that criminalizing
homosexual sodomy 2 2 was not a violation of Due Process. 21
This is hardly a ringing endorsement of discrimination
against lesbians and gay men. Not all sexually active gay
people engage in this particular activity, while some non-gay
persons do. If Bowers encompasses the limits of permissible
state criminalization of sexual activity, and if men and
women are defined by their criminalizable sexual behaviors
(two big "ifs"), then some male-female couples might find
themselves within Scalia's nomenclature as "gay" and some
same-sex couples as "non-gay." This result is probably not
what he had in mind.
Moreover, the state may not constitutionally criminalize
male-female sodomy consistent with Eisenstadt v. Baird, and
the Court's other privacy decisions. 24  As Justice Stevens
119. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
121. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing Padula v.
Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (1987)).
122. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.1. Although the Georgia statute criminalized
"any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another," the specific facts of Bowers involved consensual, male-male oral sex.
Id.; see also PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS 95-96 (1988)
(partial interview with Michael Hardwick). The Court expressed no opinion on
the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as applied to other acts. Bowers,
478 U.S. at 188 n.2.
123. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. The Court also refused to address any Equal
Protection issues in the case. Id. at 188 n.2, 196 n.8.
124. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); see also, Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); cf. Bowers, 478 U.S. at
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noted in his Bowers dissent, the different treatment of same-
sex and cross-sex sodomy gave rise to an equal protection
problem.' 5 Bowers does not resolve that problem which
closely parallels the equal protection question the Court faced
in Romer. Scalia cannot use Bowers as precedent for an issue
that was not addressed in that case. Further, Scalia never
specifies how far along the continuum of intimate, same-sex
behavior Bowers is supposed to extend its prohibitory reach.
Can the state now forbid two men from touching or kissing?'26
Is a man who hugs another man gay?
If lesbians and gay men have no identity apart from sex,
they are indeed similar to the other groups identified by the
dissent: murderers, polygamists, people who are cruel to
animals,'27 or drug addicts, smokers, gun owners, or motorcy-
clists.'28 They are a collection of miscellaneous individuals
united only by a common activity without any common, col-
lective existence or identity. Whether or not it is correct to
ascribe a gay identity to people living before the late nine-
teenth century, such as Michelangelo or Alexander the Great,
who engaged in same-sex sexual activity,'29 it is a gross over-
simplification to reduce all contemporary gay persons to their
behavior in the bedroom.
The reduction of lesbians and gay men into persons who
engage in particular sexual conduct appears in other aspects
of Justice Scalia's opinion in Romer. Like Justice Brown in
Plessy, Scalia's dissent is unsympathetic to allegations of
unequal treatment under Amendment 2. In fact, he views
the Colorado constitutional provision as simply restoring
equality by prohibiting the grant of special rights to people
"because of their homosexual conduct-that is, [Amendment
2] prohibits favored status for homosexuality."3 ' His special
rights/equality argument is flawed.
On a purely descriptive level, Justice Scalia misstates
the effect of the Colorado law. Amendment 2 does not merely
216-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing his view that Griswold, Eisenstadt,
and Carey prohibit Georgia from enforcing its statute against heterosexual
adults).
125. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Professor Amar makes this same point. See Amar, supra note 108, at
232.
127. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
128. Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
129. See supra note 69.
130. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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ban special rights and return Colorado law to neutrality.
Each of the ordinances affected by the amendment-Aspen,
Boulder, Denver, and the state Executive Order-barred dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 131 Amendment
2 prohibited anti-discrimination provisions based on homo-
sexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation only.' Thus, hetero-
sexuals would have remained protected against sexual orien-
tation discrimination under these ordinances whereas gay
people were not. Moreover, non-gay persons could have po-
litically pressed for protection because of their sexual orien-
tation in those communities without existing regulations.
Gay people would have had to call for a constitutional
amendment. This is not even formal equality, but its oppo-
site.
The only way in which this situation can appear neutral
is if sexual orientation protections are irrelevant for non-gay
persons, and thus functionally non-existent. These protec-
tions may be irrelevant to non-gay persons in one of two
ways. First, there may be no need for protection if there is no
discrimination on the basis of heterosexual sexual orienta-
tion."' Accordingly, we fail to notice the existence of non-gay
persons' protections because they lie unused and dormant.
Second, and more likely, our schema about lesbians and gay
men makes sexual orientation a relevant characteristic for
them, but not for non-gay persons. Non-gay sexual orienta-
tion is treated as the neutral baseline against which every-
thing else is measured.'34 Thus, it recedes from conscious-
ness. 3' More specifically, we do not have a separate schema
for non-gay people; they are just "people" and not a group
131. Id. at 1624 (quoting Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284-85 (Colo.
1993)).
132. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (citing COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30(b)).
133. But see Susan Ferriss & Erin McCormick, When a Kiss Isn't Just a Kiss:
Castro Bar Tosses Straight Smoochers, S.F. EXAM., Mar. 9, 1997, at Al
(reporting that a gay bar owner ejected man and woman for kissing and the San
Francisco Human Rights Commission ordered the gay bar to change anti-
heterosexual kissing policy to comply with sexual orientation discrimination
prohibitions).
134. Indeed, the word "heterosexual" did not come into the language until
preceded by, and perhaps, in contradistinction to, "homosexual." David Halp-
erin, Sex Before Sexuality: Pederasty, Politics and Power in Classical Athens,
in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY 37, 38-41 (Martin Duberman et al. eds., 1989).
135. See infra note 490 and accompanying text (discussing the awkwardness
of the expression, "openly non-gay" and the implications of that awkwardness).
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characterized by their sexual behavior.'36 Thus, it is easy to
forget or ignore the protections that exist for non-gay persons
so that denying rights to lesbians and gay men does not at all
create neutrality; rather, it subverts it.
One final illustration of the distortion in legal reasoning
that occurs when the Romer dissent employs the flawed
schema of lesbians and gay men as solely defined by sexual
activity. In his discussion of what constitutes special treat-
ment forbidden by Amendment 2, Justice Scalia writes, "it
would prevent the State or any municipality from making
death-benefit payments to the 'life-partner' of a homosexual
when it does not make such payments to the long-time
roommate of a nonhomosexual employee."'37 Again, note his
use of quotation marks around "life-partner," evidencing his
skepticism of the reality of a long-term, committed love rela-
tionship between two persons of the same sex. This is rein-
forced by his use of "long-time roommate of a nonhomosexual
employee" as the equivalent of lesbian or gay male life part-
ner. If one really believes that gay people can have life part-
ners, the appropriate non-gay analogue is "spouse" or an un-
married, committed relationship equivalent. In modern, non-
gay society there is a huge difference between roommates,
even long-term, and spouses, domestic partners or mates.
There is no less of a difference in gay life. In a world where
gay and lesbian couples share expenses, buy homes to-
136. Some segments of the gay community use the term "breeder" to refer to
all non-gay persons. E.g., Barbara Brotman, Gay Or Straight, Readers Lust For
'Savage Love,' CHI. TRIB., Nov. 21, 1996, Tempo Section at 1; Rob Morse, We're
Here, We're Having a Beer .... S.F. EXAM., June 29, 1997, at A2; Rich Kane,
AOHELL, Can A Gay Man Find Love Online?, O.C. WEEKLY (Orange County,
Calif.), Apr. 4, 1997, at 8; Michael J. Ybarra, Odd Man In: Businessman Gavin
Newsom Is the Latest Addition to S.F.'s Board of Supervisors. His Biggest Sell-
ing Point? The Fact That He's a Straight White Male - A Relatively Rare Com-
modity in that City, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at El. The rhetorical impact of
that term illustrates the pejorative, misleading, and stigmatizing effect of a
view that reduces people to one facet of their assumed sexual activity.
137. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. See generally Toni Cashnelli, Uncertain Introductions, GANNETT NEWS
SERVICE, Dec. 13, 1994, at 8, available in 1994 WL 11245538; Joyce M. Rosen-
berg, Greeting Cards Scramble to Keep Up, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis,
TN), Dec. 17, 1995, at F2. (describing the difficulty modern society has in at-
taching labels to unmarried couples' relationships); Steve Harvey, Only in LA,
L.A. TIMES, April 4, 1995, at B2. (discussing the census bureau term POSSLQ,
persons of opposite sex sharing living quarters, and the California personalized
license plate X POSSLQ).
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gether,"9 make wills naming their partners as beneficiaries, 4 '
raise families,' and generally act substantially like hetero-
sexual couples,' describing those commitments as "long-time
roommates" devalues and misrepresents them.
IV. TITLE VII
A. Gay Identity As Gender-Atypicality
In the context of Title VII litigation, the most common
aspect of the lesbian and gay male schema is the attribution
of cross-gender characteristics to gay people or to those per-
ceived to be gay.' Significantly, this schema includes of
people whom others perceive to be gay, since often only the
atypical gender behavior triggers the schema and label of
"homosexual." ' 4 Gay men are believed by non-gay males to
be more womanly than heterosexual men; 4 lesbians are
commonly seen as mannish and unfeminine.'46 Common me-
139. See, e.g., RICHARD ISAY, BEING HOMOSEXUAL: GAY MEN AND THEIR
DEVELOPMENT 86 (1989); SUSAN E. JOHNSON, STAYING POWER: LONG-TERM
LESBIAN COUPLES 49, 64-65, 95 (1990); DAVID MCWHIRTER & ANDREW
MATTISON, THE MALE COUPLE: How RELATIONSHIPS DEVELOP 82, 100, 220-21,
233 (1984).
140. See, e.g., MCWHIRTER & MATTISON, supra note 139, at 106, 222.
141. See, e.g., id. at 242-43; WARREN BLUMENFELD & DIANNE RAYMOND,
LOOKING AT GAY AND LESBIAN LIFE 372 (1988); KARLA JAY & ALLEN YOUNG,
THE GAY REPORT 134 (1978); JOHNSON, supra note 139, at 268-77.
142. Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex
Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 158 (1988) ("Many homosexual relationships
are, except for the sex of the participants and the legal status of the unions, in-
distinguishable from heterosexual marriages."); MCWHIRTER & MATTISON, su-
pra note 139, at 5; cf. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989)
(discussing the statutory definition of family in rent-control ordinance which
was expanded to include gay male couple because of the couple's dedication,
caring and self-sacrifice).
143. E.g., Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection
for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 948 (1989); Dan-
iel Goleman, Homophobia: Scientists Find Clues to Its Roots, N.Y. TIMES, July
10, 1990, at C1.
144. E.g., Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery Sch., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979)
(consolidated on appeal with DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.); Jantz v. Muci,
759 F. Supp. 1543, 1545 (D. Kan. 1991) (non-gay teacher fired for "homosexual
tendencies" because teacher reminded supervisor's secretary of her husband
"whom she believed to be gay").
145. Stephen Morin & Ellen Garfmkle, Male Homophobia, 34 J. SOC. ISSUES
29, 40-41 (1978).
146. SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM 31 (1988); JAY &
YOUNG, supra note 141, at 42-43 (girl who played boys sports labeled a "dyke");
id. at 54 (girl who wore work boots and work shirts, jeans to school labeled a
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dia images reinforce this aspect of the schema, "7 and some
statutes actually define sexual orientation as cross-gender
self-identity or perceived self-identity.'48 While the schema is
accurate for some lesbians and gay men,"' more often than
not, it is inaccurate. 5 ' Indeed, the surprise of some authori-
ties at the extent to which the cross-gender aspect of the gay
schema is counter-factual evinces its ingrained nature. 5'
From a jurisprudential perspective, this aspect of the
lesbian and gay male schema encourages a conflation of sex,
gender and sexual orientation.'52 Judges may assume that a
male plaintiff who exhibits gender atypical behavior is gay,
even when he is not. Consequently, his Title VII claim may
be transformed by judges from one based on gender to one
based on sexual orientation. If sexual orientation discrimina-
"lez."). Some gay women also hold this view. MONIKA KEHOE, LESBIANS OVER
60 SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES 46-47 (1989) (discussing one woman's dislike of the
term "lesbian" as connoting image of women trying to act like men).
147. HOWARD BROWN, FAMILIAR FACES, HIDDEN LIVES: THE STORY OF
HOMOSEXUAL MEN IN AMERICA TODAY 42 (1976); VITO Russo, THE CELLULOID
CLOSET: HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE MOVIES (rev. ed. 1994) (Chapter One is enti-
tled "Who's a Sissy? - Homosexuality According to Tinseltown"). This view is
sometimes internalized by gay people themselves. ISAY, supra note 139, at 49
(one adolescent did not believe he was really gay because the only media images
of gay men portrayed them as effeminate).
148. MINN STAT. ANN. § 363.01 (West 1995) (sexual orientation defined, in
part, as "having or perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally
associated with ones biological maleness or femaleness").
149. LEWIS, supra note 27, at 39; MCWHIRTER & MATTISON, supra note 139,
at 132.
150. Id. at 161-62; BLUMENFELD & RAYMOND, supra note 141, at 367.
151. Morin & Garfinkle, supra note 145, at 42-43 (relating amazement of
some male therapists at the apparent masculinity of men in gay bars - more
masculine than the therapists' own self-perceptions); MCWHIRTER & MATTISON,
supra note 139, at 246 (detailing group of blue collar gay men, firemen, tele-
phone linemen, construction workers, who drink beer and watch sports on TV,
as though the existence of such men were an anomaly).
Of course, it may also be true that many lesbians and gay men who are
open about their sexuality conform to this cross-gender schema. They have
relatively less to lose by publicly sharing their homosexuality, as most non-gays
will perceive them to be gay anyway. The ability of gender-conforming gay per-
sons to "pass" and thereby avoid discrimination may encourage some of those
individuals to remain "closeted." See Fajer, supra note 2, at 613-14. This ten-
dency reinforces the schema and is one of its costs.
152. Other commentators have noticed this conflation. See e.g., Mary Anne
Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); see gener-
ally, Ruth Colker, Whores, Fags, Dumb-Ass Women, Surly Blacks, and Compe-
tent Heterosexual White Males: The Sexual and Racial Morality Underlying
Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 195 (1995).
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tion in employment were illegal under federal law,153 this
transformation would have few practical consequences.
However, since the courts"" and the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission ("EEOC")'55 have specifically held that
sexual orientation discrimination is beyond the scope of Title
VII, the conflation leaves male156 plaintiffs who exhibit gender
atypical behavior remediless, and female plaintiffs with lim-
ited or uneven results, despite Supreme Court precedent.
A plurality of the United State Supreme Court recog-
nized in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,57 that an employer
who requires traditional gender conformity for female em-
ployees perpetuates gender stereotypes in violation of Title
VII. Price Waterhouse denied Ann Hopkins a promotion to
an accounting partnership despite her recognized profes-
sional and business development abilities."8 The employer
proffered that the denial of partnership was attributable to
her lack of interpersonal skills. "' This criticism was ex-
pressed as a consequence of Ms. Hopkins' gender atypical
(masculine) characteristics. Although males demonstrating
equally or more abrasive characteristics or language were
promoted to partners, the partnership negatively viewed
those same qualities exhibited by her.6' She was described
as having "overcompensated for being a woman" and needing
to enroll in a "course at charm school."'' Hopkins was ad-
vised by the partner charged with conveying the partner-
153. Some Congresspersons have introduced legislation to prohibit employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. To date, they have not
been successful. See e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-423, § 2(8) (1993).
154. See, e.g., Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 41,332 at 70, 106
(6th Cir. 1992); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir.
1979); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1975),
affd, 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
155. EEOC Dec. No. 76-67, EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6493, at 6462-63 (Mar. 2,
1976).
156. Gender atypical behavior in female plaintiffs does not always trigger
the lesbian and gay man schema leading to this conflation. See infra notes 219-
231 and accompanying text.
157. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (Brennan, J., plural-
ity opinion).
158. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1112-13 (D.D.C. 1985),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
159. Id. at 1113.
160. Id. at 1117 ("Ann has a clearly different personality... [but mlany male
partners are worse than Ann (language and tough personality)").
161. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d at 463.
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ship's decision to her to "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry."6 ' The courts found that Ms.
Hopkins was denied a partnership, in part, because Price
Waterhouse did not believe that her behavior and character-
istics were appropriate for gender.6 ' To Price Waterhouse, a
person's behavioral characteristics should be determined by
his or her sex, despite the demands of the job. This is the
double bind to which the Supreme Court plurality alluded:
"An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but
whose positions require this trait places women in an intol-
erable and impermissible Catch-22: out of a job if they be-
have aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII
lifts women out of this bind."'64
The Court's focus on the double bind Ann Hopkins faced,
obscured the core of the sex discrimination, the employer's
insistence on gender conformity. The district court recog-
nized this when it quoted County of Washington v. Gunther:'65
"In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes." 6 The provenance of this quote is
telling. The Supreme Court first used it in City of Los Ange-
les Department of Water and Power v. Manhart67 which pro-
hibited the use of actuarially appropriate statistics showing
that women live longer than men in determining employee
benefits.'68 Manhart illustrates that even accurate generali-
zations based on sex can lead to discrimination against par-
ticular individuals who do not conform to those generaliza-
tions. "'69 Accordingly, even if gender atypicality sometimes, or
even often, corresponds to homosexuality, it cannot be as-
162. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1117.
163. Id. at 1117-20 (partnership evaluation process affected by sex stereo-
typing). The D.C. Circuit Court and the Supreme Court affirmed the partner-
ship's liability. The appellate courts disagreed on the appropriate evidentiary
standard. Id.
164. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
165. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
166. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1120 (quoting Gunther, 452 U.S. at
180).
167. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
707 n.13 (1978).
168. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708.
169. Id.
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sumed in the individual case, as the lesbian and gay male
schema dictates. Gender atypicality and homosexuality are
severabl6 constructs; one does not implicate the other. When
courts realize this fact, as in Price Waterhouse, they reach the
correct result; when they do not, they err.
Moreover, the Court in Price Waterhouse explicitly stated
that, with the exception of the Bona Fide Occupational Quali-
fication (BFOQ) defense, "gender must be irrelevant to em-
ployment decisions."' 7 This statement would seem to be a
conclusive rejoinder to the concerns of Judge Williams, the
dissenting judge on the circuit court panel:
The majority [of the D.C. Circuit] implicitly adopts a novel
theory of liability under Title VII, but neither confronts
the novelty of the theory nor gives it any intelligible
bounds .... The theory is one of sexual stereotyping. An
analysis grounding Title VII liability in such stereotypes
may well be meritorious; but its articulation would require
care .... Dismissal of a male employee because he rou-
tinely appeared for work in skirts and dresses would
surely reflect a form of sexual stereotyping, but it would
not, merely on that account, support Title VII liability.
Nor, I suppose, does anyone contend that use of the femi-
nine pronoun "she" to describe a female is a forbidden
"evaluat[ion ofi female candidates in terms of their sex."171
Judge Williams is correct; the logical corollary to Price
Waterhouse is men in dresses. Indeed, this point may be seen
as the reductio ad absurdum71 of the theory; the counterpart
to outlawing the use of the pronoun "she." Why should men
in dresses be beyond legal contemplation? 7  The picture of
men in dresses raises the specter of the lesbian and gay male
schema in a way that a "tough talking, somewhat masculine
hard nosed [manager],",74 like Ann Hopkins, did not. Thus, a
man in a dress must necessarily be a homosexual, and his
claim necessarily one based on sexual orientation, not gen-
der. This conclusion would appear to be the reason that a
170. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 329-40.
171. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d at 473-74 (Williams, J., dissenting).
172. "In logic, the method of disproving an argument by showing that it leads
to an absurd consequence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (6th ed. 1990).
173. The "You've got to be kidding" nature of the argument is reminiscent of
much of the recent debate over same-sex marriage. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996).
174. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d at 463.
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dismissal of a male employee could reflect gender stereotyp-
ing, and yet not be actionable.
The courts describe the plaintiffs in these cases in an en-
lightening manner. Although we do not have Ann Hopkins's
physical description on the record, we know she was mar-
ried. 7 ' We do, however, have a description of Dixie Adair,
another successful female plaintiff and victim of sexual
stereotyping who was denied a promotion for being abrasive,
patronizing, and demanding. 177 Ms. Adair "presented a most
matronly appearance" and "possess[ed] the very essence of
womanhood,"'78 according to the trial court. Note the gender
coded terminology. Not only is she the essence of woman-
hood, but she is matronly; thus fulfilling one of the central
female gender roles, motherhood. Suggestively, the district
court may be insulating Ms. Adair from any hint of lesbian-
ism in a manner similar to the possible protection afforded to
Ms. Hopkins's by her marriage. 179 The charge of homosexu-
ality has the power to alter the courts' assessments of appro-
priate precedent.8 °
For example, in Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,'8'
a male plaintiff raised claims for sex and race discrimination,
and avoided any mention of sexual orientation causes of ac-
tion. "'82 Nevertheless, the courts treated Smith's claim as
175. Id. at 473 (Williams, J., dissenting).
There is an alternative explanation for the different results of male and
female plaintiffs' claims. That explanation relies on gender role differences to
argue that asymmetrical treatment is appropriate. This article addresses the
gender asymmetry argument. See supra, note 214 and accompanying text.
176. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d at 461. Ann Hopkins came to Price Water-
house from another accounting firm in order to avoid an anti-nepotism rule. Id.
Price Waterhouse was aware of her marriage because her husband's employ-
ment surfaced as a concern in her partnership decision. Id. at 461-62.
177. Adair v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 782 F. Supp. 558, 562 (D. Kan. 1992).
178. Id. at 563. Compare the inferences flowing from Adair's description
with Goluszek v. Smith, 687 F. Supp. 1452, 1453 (N.D. Ill. 1988), in which the
plaintiff lost: "Anthony Goluszek has never been married nor has he lived any-
where but at his mother's home .... [He] blushes easily and is abnormally sen-
sitive to comments pertaining to sex."
179. Courts have often equated marriage with heterosexuality. E.g., Gibson
v. Tanks, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (M.D. N.C. 1996). Of course, some les-
bians are married, mothers, matronly, or any combination thereof. See, e.g.,
BROWN, supra note 147, at 112; ISAY, supra note 139, at 139.
180. See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 2, at 146-147.
181. 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
182. Id. The author expresses his indebtedness to Professor Frank Valdes,
see supra note 2 for his research into the facts and pleadings of Smith.
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though it were based on sexual orientation.'83 Bennie Smith,
an Mrican-American male applied to be a mail clerk for Lib-
erty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual")." He
was rejected because the interviewing supervisor, Nathaniel
Nash, found Smith to be "effeminate," and, therefore, un-
suited for the job.'85 According to Nash, plaintiff was insuffi-
ciently "male." 6 The EEOC investigative report confirmed
and reinforced the triggering effect of gender atypical charac-
teristics and the homosexual schema by stating that Smith's
"offensive" behaviors were "quite pronounced" and that he
had "interests ... not normally associated with males
(sewing)."'87 In addition to illustrating the cross-gender trig-
ger for the lesbian and gay male schema, the EEOC investi-
gator's report evidences the well-documented tendency of
people to magnify facts which confirm their schemas, and to
downplay or ignore contradictory information.'88 Smith's ac-
tual employment application listed four hobbies: playing
musical instruments, singing, dancing and sewing.'89 The
only hobby significant enough for the EEOC investigator to
note in his report was the last, sewing. This last hobby is the
most gender identified with women.
Smith's sex discrimination claim alleged that, since the
person hired as the mail clerk was a woman, the employer
would have expected her to behave "effeminately" and have
interests such as sewing."O Those characteristics would have
been gender appropriate for a woman, but not for a man.
Therefore, Smith's non-hiring was based on his sex. Analyti-
cally, Smith's claim may be denominated as "sex-plus;" sex,
plus another neutral characteristic. It is conceptually identi-
cal to the successful legal strategy evident in Phillips v. Mar-
183. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
184. Id.
185. Valdes, supra note 2, at 139 n.396 (citing Brief for Appellee, Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co., in Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir.
1978) (No. 75-3230)).
186. Id. at 144.
187. Id. at 139 n.397 (citing Brief for Appellee, Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co., in Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) (No. 75-
3230)).
188. See, e.g., BROWER & NURIUS, supra note 10, at 54; Gottfried & Robins,
supra note 10, at 33-39; CANTOR & KIHLSTROM, supra note 10, at 1-44.
189. Valdes, supra note 2, at 139.
190. See Valdes, supra note 2, at 139 n.397 (citing Brief for Appellee, Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co., in Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978)
(No. 75-3230)).
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tin-Marietta.'9' In Phillips, the Supreme Court said that an
employer policy that prohibited the hiring of women with
preschool-aged children and permitted the hiring of men with
preschool-aged children violated Title VII. 192 That policy rein-
forced traditional gender roles; women as child caretakers,
193
men as wage earners.
Although plaintiffs have successfully challenged a range
of employer policies as sex-plus discrimination,' exceptions
exist which reflect the courts' unease with the correlation be-
tween Title VII protections and gender roles. In Willingham
v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.,195 the Fifth Circuit re-
fused to extend sex-plus discrimination protection to a male
plaintiff who was fired for having long hair, even though a
female employee with long hair would not have been termi-
nated.'96 The court stated that since hair length was neither
an immutable characteristic, nor a protected right, it could
not be the "plus" in Title VII analysis.'97 Despite Willing-
ham's argument that the grooming code was based on stereo-
types of masculinity and femininity, the court rejected its va-
lidity in invoking the protection of Title VII. 99 The majority
did not view long hair on men as triggering the gay male
schema."9 Nevertheless, the dissent drew heavily from the
district court's opinion that found a short, steep, slippery
slope from Willingham's long hair to male employees in
dresses, "lipstick, eyeshadow, and earrings." 00 The latter cir-
cumstance was beyond the contemplation of Title VII. Once
again, men in dresses constituted the conclusive rejoinder to
191. Phillips v. Martin-Marietta, 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
192. Id. at 544.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.)
(rejecting a no marriage rule for female, not male, flight attendants), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
195. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
196. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091-92.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1089.
199. On the facts of Willingham, long hair on men apparently triggered the
"hippie" schema. Id. at 1087; Willingham, 482 F.2d 535, 539 n.3 (5th Cir. 1973)
(Simpson, J., dissenting) (original panel decision).
200. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 540 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (quoting Willing-
ham, 352 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (M.D. Ga. 1972). Note the very different connota-
tion of earrings on men in the early 1970's and the late 1990's. Although resis-
tant to alteration, schemas do change over time.
19971
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a proffered legal argument."' Consequently, the court in
Willingham stated that Title VII allowed employers to take
"biological and cultural differences" into account."2 The
Smith court specified what these biological and cultural dif-
ferences signified-homosexuality. 3
Liberty Mutual successfully triggered the gay male
schema in the trial and appellate courts by producing evi-
dence of gender atypical behavior. Thus, the court trans-
formed Smith's claim from gender role discrimination to ho-
mosexuality. Accordingly, both courts allowed Liberty
Mutual to demand and enforce gender conformity in the
workplace by denying Smith's Title VII suit on the basis of
sexual orientation.0 4 The Smith court's reading of plaintiffs
claim as one of sexual orientation discrimination, rather than
gender discrimination, both misses the analytical mark and
enshrines the gender atypical behavior aspect of the lesbian
and gay male schema within Title VII doctrine.0 5 Smith,
himself, argued for preventing gender atypicality from trig-
gering the gay male schema in order to underscore the gen-
dered nature of his discrimination claim. His brief stated
that he was a happily married, heterosexual male, and was
not "demanding that an employer accept [an] unconventional
life style or mores."0 6 Smith attempted to spotlight the fact
that the employer's "refusal to hire him was not based on a
201. Compare Willingham, 507 F.2d at 540, with Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d
at 474 (Williams, J., dissenting).
202. Willingham, 352 F. Supp. at 1021.
203. See Smith, 569 F.2d at 325-27.
204. Smith, 395 F. Supp. at 1101; 569 F.2d. at 327 n.1; accord Willingham,
507 F.2d at 1092 (not sex-plus because "both sexes screened with respect to a
neutral fact, i.e., grooming in accordance with generally accepted standards of
dress and appearance."). There have been other successful employer claims to
enforce workplace gender appropriateness. See e.g., Strailey v. Happy Times
Nursery Sch., (consolidated under the name DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.),
608 F.2d. 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff teacher fired for wearing gender atypical
earring to school); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F2d. 1084 (5th Cir.
1975) (gender atypical long hair on male inappropriate, employer may legiti-
mately be concerned about image presented to customers).
205. It also helps create what Professor Valdes calls "the sexual orientation
loophole." Valdes, supra note 2, at 146-47.
206. Id. at 146 nn.430, 432 (citing Brief for Appellant, Smith, in Smith v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) (No. 75-3230)).
Note the use of marriage to buttress a conclusion of heterosexuality. See
supra note 176 and accompanying text. Note also the association of homosexu-
ality with abnormal behavior and the foisting of that abnormality on an un-
willing target. See supra notes 94, 96 and accompanying text.
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determination that plaintiff was in fact homosexual, but
rather the subjective determination that he possessed per-
sonal traits that Liberty Mutual associated by stereotype
with the female gender."2 °1
Nevertheless, once Liberty Mutual triggered the gay
male schema for the court, this difference was inconsequen-
tial.08 The district court misconstrued Smith's claim as
based on sexual orientation, when it was not. ' 9 Moreover, in
discussing Smith's sex-plus cause of action, the court evalu-
ated Smith's claim within the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Price Waterhouse:
Plaintiff points out that defendant employed a female
black applicant for the position sought by plaintiff. He
thus argues that the defendant accepted an employee pre-
sumably displaying effeminate characteristics resulting in
plaintiffs having been discriminated against because he
was male .... The Court views the situation differently.
It appears that the defendant concluded that the plaintiff,
a male, displayed characteristics inappropriate to his sex,
the counterpart being a female applicant displaying inap-
210propriate masculine attributes.
Smith and other cases involving gender atypicality in
men 211 should be logically overruled by analogy to Price Wa-
112 213
terhouse.1 2  That they are not says something significant
207. Valdes, supra note 2, at 146.
208. Of course, if Smith's assumed homosexuality, and not merely gender
atypicality, really was the cause of his non-hiring, then Title VII would not lit-
erally apply since there would be no discrimination based on sex. Accord, e.g.,
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 505 U.S. 502, 517 (1993) (explaining burdens of
proof in Title VII cases).
209. Smith, 395 F. Supp. at 1099.
210. Id. The Fifth Circuit's analysis is similar. See Smith, 569 F.2d at 327.
211. E.g., Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery Sch., 608 F.2d. 327 (9th Cir.
1979) (plaintiff teacher fired for wearing gender atypical earring to school).
212. Some commentators have so suggested. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers,
Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1159 (1991); Sam-
uel Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L. J. 1, 24-25 (1992); David R. Wade,
Women Denied Partnerships Revisited: A Response to Professors Madek and
O'Brien, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 81, 120-24 (1990). Others have rejected that con-
clusion. See, e.g., Karl Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Ap-
pearance, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395, 1420 (1992); Valdes, supra note 2, at 161.
213. See, e.g., Bedker v. Dominos Pizza, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA)
1848, 1850 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (relying on Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g
Co., 507 F.2d. 1084 (5th Cir. 1975). for the proposition that grooming codes do
not significantly affect employment opportunities); Lockhart v Louisiana-Pacific
Corp., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1412, 1413 (Or. Ct. App. 1990)
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about the persistence of the lesbian and gay male schema to
distort legal doctrine.
One might argue that the asymmetrical treatment of
male and female plaintiffs' cases is both correct and required
by the difference in male and female gender roles. According
to this view, Price Waterhouse's insistence on traditional fe-
male gender behavior locked Ann Hopkins into an inferior
and subordinate status. Conversely, Liberty Mutual's re-
quirement of traditional male gender behavior did not disad-
vantage Bennie Smith in the same way, since the male gen-
der role occupies a superior power position.214  While
insistence on formal symmetry can sometimes mask relevant
differences and lead to unjust results,215 that theory is of little
assistance in this context.
Although the "double bind" language216 of Price Water-
house might support a female gender-specific asymmetrical
approach, other aspects of the plurality's opinion contradict
it. The opinion focused on the individual nature of Ms. Hop-
kins's claim.217 Forced conformity to group norms for behav-
ior-even commonly accepted ones-still negatively affect in-
dividuals. Bennie Smith was just as surely precluded from
employment as Ann Hopkins was, and for the same reason-
their employers' insistence that they each conform their gen-
der behavior to that appropriate to their biological sex. Fur-
ther, men as well as women are protected by Title VII. Both
the Court and the EEOC have been careful to give members
of subordinated and majority groups equal access to Title VII
relief.218
(upholding employer rule prohibiting facial jewelry for men, but not for
women).
214. See generally, Carolyn Grose, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Subvert-
ing the Heterosexist Paradigm of Title VII, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 375, 380-85
(1995) (making a similar gender difference argument in the context of same-sex
sexual harassment).
215. See, e.g., Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883); Naim v. Naim, 87
S.E.2d 749, 754 (1955); McLaughlin v. State, 153 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla 1963), rev'd,
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
216. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
217. See supra notes 165-170 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)
(quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982))
(explaining that men can be victims of sexual harassment as well as its perpe-
trators); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995); Bar-
nes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 897, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 2 EEOC Compl. Man.
(BNA) § 615.2(b)(1) (1987); see also, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (white males entitled to Title VII relief); McDon-
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Although it should not preclude Bennie Smith's recovery,
gender role asymmetry does affect the lesbian and gay male
schema and legal doctrine. The distorting aspect of the les-
bian and gay male schema does not always operate in a
purely parallel manner when women are involved in the
workplace. Certain types of gender atypical behavior in
women may be acceptable, or even expected, in some con-
texts. Thus, a woman displaying them is perceived to be
within "normal" gender appropriate boundaries.219 Employers
and judges tend not to make an equation with lesbian iden-
tity, and formulate appropriate legal analogies and doctrine.
But because many workplaces and careers are traditionally
and predominantly male, women may be under pressure to
utilize more masculine attributes in these settings. Women
may be advised that in order to be hired, or be taken seri-
ously in business, they must not dress or act overtly femi-
nine--not wear too much jewelry, skirts too short, heels too
high, etc.22° At least for some jobs, therefore, a woman with
some traditionally masculine attributes may be preferred. 2'
Similarly, the choice of some traditionally masculine ca-
reers may be perceived as rational-particularly if they are
high status jobs such as an accountant, a lawyer, or a busi-
ness executive. However, cross-gender job choice by males, or
by women entering more blue-collar fields, implicates the
ald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
219. Cf. Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l, 840 F.2d 1012, 1016 (1st Cir. 1988)
(explaining that the word "amazon" is not libelous when referring to schoolgirls;
finding that there is a sufficiently wide spectrum of gender appropriate behav-
ior for schoolgirls).
220. See, e.g., Sandra Forsythe, Effect of Applicant's Clothing on Interview-
ers' Decision to Hire, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1579 (1990) (suggesting that
female applicants in more masculine attire are perceived to be more business-
like, to possess more management skills, and therefore, to be hired); Richard
Lacayo, A Hard Nose and a Short Skirt: Two Cases Raise Questions About a
Woman's On-The-Job Style, TIME, Nov. 14, 1988, at 98 (describing case of
Brenda Taylor, Assistant State Attorney, reprimanded for looking like a
"bimbo" by wearing short skirts, spike heels, designer blouses); Ellen Goodman,
O.J. Prosecutor Hears Critics Put Her Style on Trial, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 21,
1994, at B7 (describing decision by Marcia Clark, O.J. Simpson prosecutor to
appear less masculine by changing her hairstyle and dress.); WORKING GIRL
(20th Century-Fox 1988) (advice given to the protagonist, a female secretary, on
the first day of work for her new female boss, that overtly feminine dress is in-
consistent with the professional tenor of her position).
221. Recall the Supreme Court's description of the double bind Ann Hopkins
faced at the accounting firm, Price Waterhouse. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
251.
1997]
102 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
lesbian and gay male schema." Contrast the common per-
ception of a woman who seeks to be a corporate securities at-
torney with one who wants to be a bulldozer driver 22-or a
man who desires to be a nurse or receptionist. Social psy-
chology research bears out this insight. One study of this is-
sue found that men entering traditional female professions
were asked about their "masculinity" (viz., sexual orienta-
tion); women were not.22 Tellingly, by using the noun
"masculinity" to cover references to homosexuality, the
authors of the study also equated gender atypicality with the
lesbian and gay male schema.2 ' Thus, the example illus-
trates the persistence of the schema, even among researchers
who study the societal aspects of gender roles.
The difference in treatment between gender atypical men
and women may be partially attributed to the perceived
status gains or losses associated with taking traditional male
or female jobs. 26 A man who takes a traditionally female
role, by becoming a secretary, for instance, loses social status.
A woman however, gains status when she takes a tradition-
ally male career, such as a lawyer.2 The man's choice may
be perceived as "peculiar," 8 the woman's as natural. 9 The
222. Accord Richard Levenson, Sex Discrimination in Employment Practices:
An Experiment with Unconventional Job Inquiries, in WOMEN AND WORK:
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 54, 61 (Rachel Kahn-Hut et al. eds., 1982).
223. Compare the courts' sympathies to the female plaintiffs in Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (accountant), with Valdes v. Lumber-
men's Mutual Casualty Co., 507 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (lower level ware-
house employee).
224. Levenson, supra note 222, at 61.
225. "Interestingly, several male... callers were questioned about their
'masculinity' (e.g., 'Are you a queer?')." Levenson, supra note 222, at 61.
226. Lisa A. Serbin & Carol H. Sprafkin, A Developmental Approach: Sexu-
ality from Infancy Through Adolescence, in THEORIES OF HUMAN SEXUALITY
163, 177 (James H. Geer & William T. O'Donohue eds., 1987). "Girls who ex-
hibit cross-sex-typed behavior receive far less censure than boys, possibly be-
cause of the higher status that male sex roles have in our culture .... Id.
227. Fajer, supra note 2, at 628. Some have argued that men losing status
by taking female roles (and vice versa) is the key to homophobia. See, e.g., Val-
des, supra note 2, at 258-59; Nan Hunter, Marriage Law and Gender: A Femi-
nist Inquiry, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 9 (1991) (arguing that opposition to same-sex
marriage stresses the fact that it would undermine traditional male domi-
nant/female passive roles); see also Nikolaus Benke, Women and the Courts: An
Old Thorn in Men's Sides, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 195, 247 (1995) (stating that
ancient Roman law abridged the litigation rights of the penetrated male in ho-
mosexual male intercourse just as if he were a woman).
228. Levenson, supra note 222, at 61.
229. Of course, it was not always so. For a famous example of a woman's
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available alternative explanation that women are seeking in-
creased status may explain why courts have been more read-
ily able to recognize discrimination against women on the ba-
sis of gender atypicality as violating Title VII, but have been
unable to make a parallel conclusion with men.
Cognitive psychologists have found that people seize
upon even tenuous theories to rationalize inexplicable events
or behavior,23 ° and that schemas often fill this need for order
and rationality.23 ' Consequently, employers and judges may
call upon the lesbian and gay male schema when increased
status or other acceptable reasons cannot explain gender
atypical behavior.232 Accordingly, when masculine women
who work in high status careers appear before the courts as
plaintiffs, they often do not trigger the lesbian schema. Once
we factor in the lesbian and gay male schema, the contrast
between the outcomes in Price Waterhouse and Smith ap-
pears less confusing.
B. Sexual Harassment
Although it is well established that Title VII prohibits
sexual harassment in the workplace perpetrated by men
against women233 and by women against men,234 once again
the presence of lesbians or gay men often derails proper judi-
cial analysis. Courts are split as to whether same-sex sexual
harassment violates Title VII, even though the two claims
are more alike than different.
choice to enter the legal profession viewed as unnatural, see Bradwell v. Illinois,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
230. See ROBERT H. LAUER & WARRREN H. HANDEL, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:
THE THEORY AND APPLICATION OF SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM 5-6 (2d ed. 1983).
231. BROWER & NURIUS, supra note 10, at 13-14.
232. Remember the rhetorical question, "Is a man who hugs another man
gay?," asked in the context of Justice Scalia's Romer dissent. See supra note
126 and accompanying text. One might have replied, not if he is a football
player congratulating a teammate after a touchdown, or other such example.
That response employs the same search for alternative explanations to make a
man hugging another man fit one's definition of rationality. In fact, the male-
male hug may have nothing to do with his being gay or a football player - or the
man may be both. See, e.g., DAVID KOPAY & PERRY DEANE YOUNG, THE DAVID
KOPAY STORY (1977) (autobiography of a gay NFL player).
233. E.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Sav.
Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
234. E.g., Anderson v. S.U.N.Y. Health Science Ctr., 836 F. Supp. 625
(N.D.N.Y. 1993) (permitting Title VII claim, but rejecting liability due to insuf-
ficient evidence); cf Garinella v. General Elec., 833 F. Supp. 617 (W.D. Ky.
1993) (state anti-discrimination statute).
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Courts traditionally divide sexual harassment into two
types: quid pro quo and hostile environment.35 The former is
a request for sexual favors, which is directly linked to an eco-
nomic or other tangible benefit.236 The latter describes a
workplace where employees are subject to unwanted sexual
attention or discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and in-
sult,237 without a direct connection to employment benefits.
Although the elements for the two causes of action differ
slightly, 238 the difference does not affect our analysis. Both
are based on subjecting members of one sex to conduct or be-
havior (and thus terms and conditions of employment) not
applicable to members of the other sex.239 Both are created by
unwanted sexual advances or other verbal or physical activ-
ity of a sexual nature.24 °
In same-sex sexual harassment situations, however, ex-
amining the perpetrator's motivations more usefully clarifies
the analysis. Some sexual harassment appears to be moti-
vated by attraction or desire for the harassment victim, oth-
ers by hostility or antipathy toward the individual.241 Thus,
requests for sexual favors, dates and similar physical ad-
vances would fall into the attraction-based sexual harass-
242ment category. Sexual innuendoes, taunts, unwanted sex-
ual attention, or other conduct of a sexual nature that is so
"sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victims employment" and which fill the workplace with
"discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult,"2 3 consti-
tute hostility-based sexual harassment. 2'4 The distinction be-
tween attraction- and hostility-based sexual harassment re-
235. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-65.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 65.
238. Prescott v. Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. at
1549.
239. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-65.
240. Id. at 65.
241. This division is not meant to suggest that the two categories are mutu-
ally exclusive, or that sexual advances ostensibly motivated by desire cannot
evidence hostility towards women in the workplace. See, e.g., CATHARINE
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 209-10 (1979).
242. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. 60.
243. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav.
Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)).
244. See, e.g., id.
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mains relatively unnoticed by the courts.245 Further, courts
have not traditionally required plaintiffs to show motive, nor
does this article suggest that they should. However, motiva-
tion may serve as an analytical tool to understand how the
lesbian and gay male schema affects same-sex sexual har-
assment cases.
1. The Mechanics of Sexual Harassment
Attraction-based sexual harassment cases present some
significant analytic differences from the archetypal Title VII
disparate treatment case.4 6 In the latter situation, as in
typical hostility-based sexual harassment, an employer or his
agent treats an individual or class of persons differently be-
cause of their sex147 or race,248 as examples. Thus, in Rosen-
feld v. Southern Pacific,2 49 Leah Rosenfeld and all other
women were affected equally-none was permitted to be
agent-telegraphers.25 ° However, in a typical attraction-based,
sexual harassment suit, the harasser does not target all
women (or men), but only the few he (or she) finds sexually
appealing.
245. But see Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495,
1500-01 (E.D. Va. 1996).
246. These differences have prompted one commentator to call for the intro-
duction of a separate tort of sexual harassment. Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual
Harassment As Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 333 (1990).
247. E.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971)
(exclusion of women from job as agent-telegrapher); Newport News Shipbuild-
ing & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) (insurance plan disfavored
married male employees over married female employees).
248. E.g., Texas Dep't of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)
(white males entitled to Title VII relief); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (white employees disciplined more harshly than black
employees).
249. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971)
250. Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d at 1219.
Courts have recognized a second type of Title VII lawsuit, Disparate Im-
pact, a neutral policy which disproportionately affects a protected class. See,
e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (high school diploma re-
quirement disproportionately affected black employees); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirement disproportionately affected
women).
Some commentators have argued that sexual orientation discrimination
might disproportionately affect men, thus violating Title VII. E.g., Charles
Calleros, The Meaning of 'Sex. Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment Under
Title VII, 20 VT. L. REV. 55, 59-60 (1995). But see DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. &
Tel. Co., 608 F.2d at 333-34 (Sneed, J., dissenting). This article does not.
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Early on, some judges seized upon the difference between
the two claims in order to reject liability. 5' Other courts rea-
soned that sexual harassment was not sex discrimination
since the real reason for the disparate treatment was plain-
tiffs refusal to have a sexual relationship and not the em-
ployer's dislike of women.25 Later courts rejected both pro-
posed distinctions. A supervisor, who demands sexual favors
from a female because he is attracted to her, does so, if het-
erosexual, because only members of her sex have the poten-
tial to be found sexually appealing to him. Accordingly, but
for her sex, she would not be treated differently.5
In contrast, anti-female, hostility-based sexual harass-
ment is jurisprudentially more like other forms of disparate
treatment under Title VII. Harassment can take many
forms, including conduct without any explicitly sexual con-
tent:.. unwanted physical contact of a sexual nature (e.g.,
groping, rubbing, intentional bumping, staring);55 insults;
ridicule and other verbal abuse referring to gender (e.g.,
"bitch, slut, stupid woman");5 . and sex-based refusal to coop-
erate or hard-timing (e.g., not trading shifts, not sharing
workload). 57 Naturally, these types of behaviors are neither
exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. Any given situation can
have many different examples of harassing behavior.258 The
key in each of these situations, is that an individual was tar-
geted because she was female. Unwanted touching and ver-
bal harassment of women in the workplace undermines the
251. E.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork,
J., dissenting, affd on other grounds sub nom., Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); accord Paul, supra note 246, at 349-50.
252. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA), 123, 124 (D. D.C.
1974), rev'd sub nom., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
253. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
("The critical issue ... is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvan-
tageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex
are not exposed."); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
254. Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988); Andrews v.
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990).
255. E.g., Agugliaro v. Brooks Bros., 927 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
256. Jensen v. Evaleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 880, 883 (D. Minn.
1993); Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1996).
257. E.g., Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1473 (files taken and/or defaced, not given
certain assignments, equipment sabotaged); Porta v. Rollins Envtl. Serv., Inc.,
654 F. Supp. 1275, 1279 (D. N.J. 1987).
258. See, e.g., Andrews, 895 F.2d 1469 (sexual comments and innuendo, por-
nography, destruction of office equipment, hiding of files).
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woman's role as worker and can be traced to a view by men
that women are sexual playthings.259 Comments like "Whore,
what's the amount?" to a female bookkeeper or "Women are
only good for fucking""6° are but blatant illustrations of the
denigration of women because of sex. 6' This type of treat-
ment of women signals to them that they are not equals in
the workplace with men. 62 Thus, it is related to hard-timing
or non-sexual disparate treatment of female workers.
In Andrews v. Philadelphia,6' female police officers
worked in an environment that did not accept peace officer as
a gender-appropriate career choice for women.264 Plaintiffs
were told both verbally, and through male co-workers' con-
duct, that they did not belong in the department.265 Hostility-
based sexual harassment is, thus, also parallel to classic ex-
amples of racial discrimination under Title VII.2 6
Even in hostility-based sexual harassment, a perpetrator
259. See LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WOMEN ON THE JOB 13 (1978); Accord JUDITH P. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:
FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 19 (1990) (discussing the identifi-
cation of women with sex).
260. EEOC v. A. Sam & Sons Produce Co., 872 F. Supp. 29, 34-36 (W.D.N.Y.
1994).
261. FARLEY, supra note 259, at 14-15; BUTLER, supra note 259, at 19;
MACKINNON, supra note 241, at 209-10.
262. MACKINNON, supra note 241, at 235.
263. 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
264. Id. at 1472-78 (discussing treatment of two female officers by male co-
workers).
265. Id. at 1475 (files missing, after plaintiff requested a transfer, male su-
perior officer said, "You women don't know what you want. Why don't you stay
in one place like a man?," and superior confronted female officer's complaint of
equipment sabotage with, "You know you're no spring chicken. You have to ex-
pect this working with the guys."). The court found that supervisory person-
nel's treatment of the conduct with a "boys will be boys" attitude signified cul-
pable acquiescence to the sexual harassment. Id. at 1479. In contrast, in cases
involving lesbian and gay men, the courts have treated a similar cavalier su-
pervisorial attitude as the appropriate response. Accord Quick v. Donaldson
Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (court dismisses unwanted
touching of plaintiffs genitals as "juvenile mischief and immature behavior"),
rev'd, 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996); See, e.g., Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp.
1452, 1454-56 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F.
Supp. 822, 828 (D. Md. 1994) (plaintiff and offending supervisor told to "stop
acting like little boys."); But cf Nabozny v. Podlesney, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir.
1996) (openly gay student told by school officials to expect and accept harass-
ment was not given an appropriate response).
266. Compare Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1475 (3d Cir. 1990).
(female police officers harassed), with Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094
(2d Cir. 1986) (African-American and Hispanic correctional officers harassed).
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need not direct his or her attention to all employees of one
sex at work, but only to a particular individual because of
that person's sex. In Harris v. Forklift Systems,"' the Su-
preme Court treated as sexual harassment, a workplace full
of sexual innuendo, apparently not intended as evidence of
sexual attraction for Ms. Harris, but demonstrating hostility
toward her and other women." 8 The salient feature is that
she was exposed to this treatment because she was a
woman.2 69 Moreover, a pervasively sexualized workplace, in
which pornography, comments, horseplay and other physical
activity of a sexual nature abound, can also create a hostile
environment-with or without specifically targeting an indi-
vidual. 27" Thus, analytically, sexual harassment need not be
directed at all members of a particular sex, and need not be
based on sexual attraction or desire, but may be based on
hostility or intimidation targeted at an individual because of
gender.
2. The Role of Sexual Attraction and Sexuality
Sexual harassment cases may involve two different be-
haviors, attraction and hostility, with sexual orientation
playing a different role in each of these situations. In attrac-
tion-based sexual harassment, sexual desire serves to iden-
tify the potential class of victims: a non-gay supervisor tar-
gets a member of the opposite sex because of that individual's
sex; a gay man or lesbian selects a member of the same sex
for the same reason.27" ' Sexual orientation is the key to the
but for causation. 72 In hostility-based, same-sex sexual har-
assment, presumably non-gay persons target a lesbian or gay
male (or assumed lesbian or gay male) for sexual conduct, in-
nuendo and denigration of that individual ostensibly because
267. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
268. Harris, 510 U.S. at 19.
269. Id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
270. See generally, e.g., Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir.
1990) (pornographic magazines and devices left on female police officer's desk,
sexual innuendoes and comments); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,
760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (many instances of pornographic photos, etc.
and sexual comments at shipyards).
271. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waldenbook Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn.
1995); Marrero-Rivera v. Dept. of Justice, 800 F. Supp. 1024 (D. P.R. 1992);
Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
272. Waag v. Thomas Pontiac Buick, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393, 401-02 (D. Minn.
1996).
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of that individual's sexuality."' In attraction-based cases, the
parallels to cross-sex sexual harassment cases are straight-
forward; in hostility-based cases, the analysis is more re-
fined.7 4
a. Attraction-Based Sexual Harassment
The first category, attraction-based, same-sex sexual
harassment, fits neatly within the prototypical cross-sex, at-
traction-based case. If a male harasses a female by seeking
unreciprocated sexual favors, that female employee is being
treated differently because of her sex.17 ' By parity of reason-
ing, a gay supervisor who gives unwanted sexual attention to
an employee of the same sex is imposing a discriminatory
term or condition of employment because of that individual's
sex. Neither the sex of the employer/employee pair, nor the
sexual orientation of the employee should be relevant to the
analysis.276
273. See, e.g., Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Garcia v.
Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994); Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332 at 70,102 (6th Cir. 1992). Although a gay supervisor
or co-worker may hostilely harass a non-gay employee because of that em-
ployee's sexuality, that situation is far from typical. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of
Am., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996), may illustrate that situation, although
the court treated it as though it were typical, attraction-based sexual harass-
ment.
274. The more complex nature of same-sex, hostility-based sexual harass-
ment has prompted some courts to limit their holdings to attraction-based
claims. E.g., Fredette v. FVP Mgt. Assoc., Inc., 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997);
Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 1997).
275. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25-26 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
276. E.g., Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Colo.
1996); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev.
1996).
Although the author did not discover a case in which an agent of the em-
ployer demanded sexual favors from an employee of the opposite sex who he or
she (presumably) erroneously thought was heterosexual-and was therefore
sexually unavailable to the harasser, analytically this should not matter. The
focus of Title VII doctrine is whether the harasser treats a member of one sex
differently from members of the other sex. EEOC Compl. Man.
(BNA) § 615.2(b)(3) (1987); see generally, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 68-69 (1986) (stating that the question is whether the sexual advances were
unwelcome, not whether they were voluntary, or whether the dress or behavior
of the victim dictated such a finding). But see supra note 308 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the significance to the Fourth Circuit that a gay harasser
targeted a non-gay employee).
Moreover, some courts have also reasoned that in same-sex sexual harass-
ment the plaintiff must plead and prove that the harasser is gay or lesbian.
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Some courts have recognized this congruence and have
found same-sex sexual harassment actionable under Title
VII" Most of those cases have been attraction-based sexual
harassment.278 They illustrate the schema of a sexual har-
assment matter-unwanted sexual attention in the work-
place. Same-sex, attraction-based, sexual harassment most
closely resembles the prototype of cross-sex sexual harass-
ment. It is unsurprising that courts are able to incorporate
unwanted homosexual attention into the paradigmatic het-
erosexual, attraction-based, sexual harassment prototype
found in Title VII cases. 79 The key component of that proto-
type is that, but for an individual's sex, he or she would not
have been a target of harassment because sexual attraction is
limited to that sex. 8° Prototype matching, or representative-
E.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.
1996). Superficially, this requirement appears reasonable. However, it evi-
dences a misunderstanding of sexual harassment doctrine and the analogy to
cross-sex sexual harassment. See infra notes 300-311, 401-415 and accompa-
nying text.
277. E.g., EEOC v. Waldenbook Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102-04 (M.D. Tenn.
1995) (discussing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), and reason-
ing by analogy to it.); Marrero-Rivera v. Department of Justice, 800 F. Supp.
1024 (D. P.R. 1992); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala.
1983).
278. E.g., Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1503; Yeary, 107 F.3d at 443. Those courts
have clarified that their holdings only extended to attraction-based sexual har-
assment claims. Id. at 448; Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1503.
Even in same-sex situations, the line between these two categories can be
murky. E.g., McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.
Ga. 1995) (white female plaintiff sexually harassed by African-American female
co-workers.). In McCoy, Robin McCoy alleged that Marjorie Ivey rubbed her
breasts against her, rubbed McCoy between her legs and forced her tongue
down McCoy's throat, id. at 231, all of which would indicate sexual attraction.
However, there was also evidence that Ivey and another co-worker called
McCoy, "stupid poor white trash" or "stupid poor white bitch" and stated that
they would make plaintiff quit, as they had made other "white bitches." Id.
These comments would seem to show animosity, both racial and sexual. Since
the harassment was by co-workers without the ability to promote or fire McCoy,
quid pro quo sexual harassment was inapplicable. Id. at 231-32. The court
properly decided that plaintiff demonstrated hostile environment sexual har-
assment and did not inquire into motive. Id. at 232. For another example
where the line between attraction-based and hostility-based sexual harassment
is unclear, see Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
279. E.g., Waldenbook Co., 885 F. Supp. at 1102-04; McCoy, 878 F. Supp. at
232; Prescott v. Indep. Life and Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550
(M.D. Ala. 1995).
280. E.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d. 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[Iln
each instance the question is... would the complaining employee have suffered
the harassment had he or she been of a different gender?"); Wrightson v. Pizza
Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996).
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ness heuristics, as a decision-making tool, is consistent with
the use of schemas and cognitive psychology.28' Accordingly,
for judges who have held that same-sex sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII, the same-sex or cross-sex nature
of the pairing is a distinction without significance;2. 2 like the
difference between chairs with arms and those without, both
are chairs."'
The lesbian and gay male schema may actually reinforce
this congruence in a limited set of circumstances: when a gay
supervisor harasses a non-gay employee. Recall that one as-
pect of the lesbian and gay male schema is the predatory,
lustful, or purely sexual nature of homosexual liaisons that
do not reflect loving, long-term relationships."4 Plaintiffs' at-
torneys in these cases have been known to capitalize on this
schema to enlist the judge's antipathy towards gay people
and to provoke sympathy for the victims of same-sex sexual
harassment."' It is appears that proof of the unwelcome na-
ture of the advances is unnecessary; no heterosexual plaintiff
would have encouraged or desired this unnatural attention.
This use of the lesbian and gay male schema works only
as a one-way ratchet. Same-sex sexual harassment is action-
able when the harasser is homosexual and the victim hetero-
sexual, but not the reverse, or when both are homosexual or
both heterosexual. The court in Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Es-
tate Management Company286 suggested a clue to deciphering
this distinction. In Pritchett, a lesbian supervisor sexually
harassed a female employee. 87 The district court rejected
precedent in the Fifth Circuit denying recovery for same-sex
sexual harassment so that the court could protect non-gay
281. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
282. E.g., Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 142; Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55
(D.C. Cir. 1977); EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.2(b)(3) (1987) ("The victim
does not have to be of the opposite sex from the harasser.").
283. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text; see, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec.
H.7441, H.7444, (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (Rep. Coburn (R-Okla.) remarked on
the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997): "[wlhat
[my constituents] believe is that homosexuality is immoral, that it is based on
perversion, that it is based on lust.").
285. Dale Carpenter, Same Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 37 So.
TEX. L. REV. 699, 705 n.26 (1996).
286. Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Mgt. Co., 1995 WL 241855 (E.D. La.
Apr. 25, 1995).
287. Id. at *1.
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persons from the sexual predations of homosexuals.288
Giddens and Garcia [Fifth Circuit precedents denying
coverage] notwithstanding, it seems discriminatory that a
supervisor should be exempt from a Title VII sexual har-
assment claim solely because of that supervisor's sexual
orientation. To deny a claim of same gender sexual har-
assment allows a homosexual supervisor to sexually har-
ass his or her subordinates either on a quid pro quo basis
or by creating a hostile work environment, when a hetero-
sexual supervisor may be sued under Title VII for similar
conduct. Although it is clear that Title VII does not pro-
tect a homosexual who is discriminated against based on
his or her sexual orientation, here it is not the homosexual
who seeks to be protected. To conclude that same gender
harassment is not actionable under Title VII is to exempt
homosexuals from the very laws that govern the work-
place conduct of heterosexuals .289
This portion of the court's opinion is telling in several re-
spects. First, the passage is consistent with Smith and with
the distorting effect of the lesbian and gay male schema. The
judge jumps immediately from the notion that, had a gay
plaintiff been involved, the case would have been barred be-
cause Title VII does not cover sexual orientation discrimina-
tion. That conclusion is erroneous; the discrimination would
still have been based on sex, not sexual orientation.
Second, one can hear in the Pritchett court's concern
about providing an exemption for homosexuals an echo of the
"no special rights" rhetoric of some anti-gay rights advo-
cateS2 ° and of the dissent in Romer v. Evans.91 Although
same-sex sexual harassment could now be actionable under
Title VII, the holding merely closes a loophole that homo-
sexuals could exploit. This is especially clear when we re-
member that the judge clarified that he was only protecting
heterosexuals by this holding, not homosexuals. This last
point can only be true if one of three erroneous assumptions
is valid: (1) title VII simply treats gay and lesbian plaintiffs
288. Id. at *2.
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., Pamela Coukos, Civil Rights and Special Wrongs-The
Amendment 2 Litigation, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 580, 582, 584 (1994); see
also Jane Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the
Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283 (1994).
291. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1630 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
292. Pritchett, 1995 WL 241855, at *2.
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differently; (2) same-sex sexual harassment is only practiced
by gay people against non-gay persons-and not against
other gay individuals; or (3) gay persons' harassment of other
gay people is not actionable sexual harassment equivalent to
that suffered by non-gay victims.
The language of Title VII does not support the first op-
tion. The courts that have refused to extend the prohibition
against sex discrimination in Title VII to cover sexual orien-
tation do not simply exclude homosexual, but not heterosex-
ual orientation. To be accurate, the research for this article
has not discovered a case in which a non-gay person claimed
sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII.292  Such a
lopsided exclusion would, however, have been the result of
the Aspen and Boulder, Colorado anti-discrimination ordi-
nances had Colorado's Amendment 2 gone into effect.294 Fur-
ther, the second cannot factually be correct; gay on gay sex-
ual harassment must occur.295
The third option is untenable unless we consider the ef-
fects of the lesbian and gay male schema. Because that
schema states that gay relations are purely uncontrolled, in-
discriminate physical and sexual escapades,296 sexual ad-
vances by one homosexual towards another would not consti-
tute harassment. Sexual attention cannot be unwelcome
unless gay sexuality encompasses notions of selectivity and
fidelity. If it does not encompass these notions, then sexual
conduct in the workplace is always desirable, reciprocated
and non-actionable.29 Accordingly, gay or lesbian victims
293. See Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169, 1175 (D. Nev. 1995). The
Fox case comes closest. Plaintiffs claimed that they suffered sexual harassment
as males because of the workplace discussions and pictures of gay sexual activ-
ity. Id. at 1172.
294. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1630 (1996) (citing COLO. CONST. art.
II, § 30(b); ASPEN MUN. CODE § 13-98 (1977); BOULDER REV. CODE §§ 12-1-1 to
12-1-11 (1987) (banning discrimination, inter alia, on the basis of sexual orien-
tation in employment, housing, accommodations) repealed to the extent that
they would have prohibited discrimination against homosexuals, bisexuals, but
remaining intact in their ban on discrimination against heterosexuals.); Romer,
116 S. Ct. at 1629; see supra notes 131-20 and accompanying text.
295. See generally, e.g., Woman Wins $ 360,000 Bias Case; Verdict May be
First Where Boss, Employee Were Both Lesbians, S.F. ExAM., July 4, 1997, at A7
(discussing jury award in California state lawsuit).
296. See, e.g., supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the gay iden-
tity as sex aspect of the lesbian and gay male schema).
297. The issue of unwelcomeness has also bedeviled sexually active female
plaintiffs. E.g., Burns v. McGregor Elecs. Indus., 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993)
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would not require protection from attraction-based sexual
harassment because it would not truly occur in the legal
sense. It is this last reading which makes the Pritchett
court's exclusive protection of non-gay persons possible.
Finally, the Pritchett court leaves logical gaps in its
analysis because it does not address the difference between
attraction-based and hostility-based sexual harassment
claims. Garcia and Giddings were hostility-based claims; the
harassers were presumably heterosexual persons and the
harassment victims were perhaps gay (or perceived to be
gay). That is the only context in which one may properly
speak of sexual orientation as the basis for a claim and of the
corresponding exclusion of those claims from Title VII's cov-
erage. Homosexuality, and not sex, is no more the foundation
for an attraction-based sexual harassment suit than hetero-
sexuality is the basis of a cross-sex sexual harassment cause
of action. In both cases, the sexual orientation of the har-
asser is relevant only to explain why the harasser selected
members of a particular sex as targets.298 But for their sex,
the victims would not have been among the objects of the
unwanted attention.
In hostility-based claims, however, the victims' sexuality
may conceivably be the characteristic that provokes co-
workers' behavior, and thus constitute the impermissible ba-
sis for the Title VII claim. Nevertheless, even in hostility-
based claims, many of those suits are more accurately envi-
sioned as gender-based causes of action within Title VII, as
later portions of this article explain.299 Because of the confu-
sion between of hostility- and attraction-based causes of ac-
tion, the Pritchett court inappropriately analogizes two dis-
tinct factual constructs, thereby rendering a sexual
harassment claim into one based on sexual orientation, thus
not actionable.
Even where judges come to a correct conclusion, the dis-
tortions inherent in their schema of lesbians and gay men
may lead to a skewed reading of facts or a mistaken applica-
tion of legal doctrine. In an interesting twist on Pritchett's
one-way ratchet, the Fourth Circuit, in Wrightson v. Pizza
(woman who had pierced nipples and had posed semi-nude for magazine not
thereby disqualified from claiming sexual harassment).
298. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
299. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
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Hut of America, allowed a Title VII claim by a non-gay em-
ployee against his gay supervisor and co-workers, to with-
stand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion."' Viewing the case as homosexual, attraction-based
sexual harassment, the court properly analogized gay male-
male harassment to Supreme Court and other male-female
precedent. However, the actual facts of Wrightson are com-
plex.
Wrightson contained many allegations of egregious con-
duct. Gay male supervisors and other gay employees sexu-
ally propositioned Arthur Wrightson and two other non-gay
employees. They were subject to sexual innuendo, descrip-
tions of gay sex, and inappropriately touched.3"' However,
the court initially focused on the wrong issue regarding
whether the perpetrator was gay °. The important prelimi-
nary issue should have been whether the sexual harassment
was attraction- or hostility-based. Only if it was attraction-
based, did the perpetrators' homosexuality provide the link to
sex discrimination. Instead, the Fourth Circuit required that
the harassers be gay,30 3 as though homosexuality alone is al-
ways an adequate substitute for desire-based sexual harass-
ment.
Of course, gay people can be motivated by desire to har-
ass others of the same sex. Wrightson may, in fact, be such a
case. Nevertheless, gay people, like their non-gay counter-
parts, may have any number of possible rationales for their
actions-not all of which are sexual or based on sexual de-
sire. The schema of lesbians and gay men as predatory or in-
discriminate in their sexual behavior enabled the court to
make this inappropriate link.
The Fourth Circuit's insistence that the key allegation in
same-sex sexual harassment is the perpetrator's homosexu-
ality30 4 led the court to downplay other potentially important
facts. Most striking is one initial fact mentioned by the
court. "After Pizza Hut hired a male employee, the homosex-
300. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996).
301. Id. at 139-41.
302. See id. at 141.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 144 ("Therefore, because a claim may lie under Title VII for same-
sex hostile work environment sexual harassment, where, as here, the individual
charged with the discrimination is a homosexual, the judgment of the district
court is reversed.").
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ual employees attempted to learn whether the new employee
was homosexual or heterosexual. If the employee was het-
erosexual, then the homosexual employees began to pressure
the employee into engaging in homosexual sex." °5 This fact
is significant, for it undermines Wrightson's claim of sex dis-
crimination and may turn it into one based on sexual orienta-
tion. If gay male employees were not sexually harassed, but
non-gay male employees were, the reason for the selection of
Wrightson and the others appears to be their sexuality and
not their sex.' °6 If this were truly attraction-based sexual
harassment, why would the sole targets be non-gay males? It
is difficult to believe that the non-gay Pizza Hut employees
were always much more attractive than the gay employees.
Either desire is not the true reason for their selection, or we
need something else to explain the attractiveness of the non-
gay males. The schema of predatory gay sex, where gay peo-
ple recruit non-gay persons into sexual activity. 7 is consis-
tent with the court's decision that targeting only non-gay
males shows sexual harassment based on desire and not on
sexual orientation.
Moreover, the court's description of another event also
evidences the distorting effect of the lesbian and gay male
schema: "Wilson [a gay employee] called Wentzel [a non-gay
employee] at Wentzel's home and asked him on a date, even
though Wilson was aware that Wentzel was heterosexual."308
The inference we are supposed to draw from the last clause of
305. Id. at 139 (citations to the record omitted).
306. When Pizza Hut made this argument, the court responded by stating
that, on a motion to dismiss, Wrightson's claims were sufficient. Id. at 143.
Wrightson stated that he was discriminated against because he was male, that
his harassers were homosexuals, and that other harassed employees were also
male. Id. at 143-44.
307. See, e.g., B.G. Gregg, Group Says Gay Students Need Affirmation at
School. Teacher: Goal Is Education, Not Recruitment, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
Dec. 22, 1996, at B4; Ernie Freda, Washington In Brief, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Oct. 12, 1995, at 6B (discussing the views of Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), that
school programs dealing with gays and lesbians may be thinly veiled efforts to
recruit new homosexuals); Sandra Crockett & Chris Kaltenbach, Ellen's Night
Out; TV While Many Turn out to Celebrate the Much-Hyped Event, Others
Pledge Financial Consequences for Sponsors of the ABC Show, BALTIMORE SUN,
May 1, 1997, at 1E (describing the scene in which Laura Dern, playing the love
interest in the episode, countered Ellen's accusation that she was trying to re-
cruit gays by lamenting, "Just one more and I would have gotten that toaster
oven.").
308. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 140 (4th Cir. 1996).
116 [Vol. 38
A STRANGER TO ITS LAWS
the quote is that Wilson's request was unwelcome. Literally,
however, it merely states that Wilson's request was probably
futile because Wentzel was not gay. This implies that had
Wentzel been gay, Wilson's demand would have been neither
futile, nor unwelcome. Accordingly, there would have been
no harassment.
That conclusion is possible only if the schema of lesbians
and gay men is that gay sex is indiscriminate and non-
selective. Note that we have no such schema about hetero-
sexuality. A non-gay man can still harass a non-gay woman,
although she may be sexually attracted to men-the question
is unwelcomeness, not her sexuality.0 9 The sexuality-linked
reading of unwelcomeness can, however, buttress the conclu-
sion that gay male harassment of solely non-gay males is ac-
tionable sexual harassment. Gay targets of gay harassers
would not have a cause of action because they would be un-
able to demonstrate unwelcomeness, something that is as-
sumed with non-gay victims. Once again, the court uses ho-
mosexuality and its schema as a substitute for analysis of the
relevant issues.
Finally, the Wrightson court's equation of gay perpetra-
tors' sexual orientation with attraction-based sexual harass-
ment may have led the court to over-emphasize the extent to
which sexual desire actually motivated the harassers. Pic-
ture a workplace in which non-gay male employees first de-
termine which new female hires are non-gay and which are
lesbians. They then demand sexual favors only from the les-
bian employees, tell them that they should try sex with men,
grope them, and subject them to explicit descriptions of het-
erosexual sex acts.3 10 Although we might view the behavior
as motivated by a genuine desire to have sexual relations
with these women, we would probably view the conduct as
evidencing hostility toward lesbianism."' The difference in
our perception of these two scenarios is attributable to the
considerably more nuanced schema of non-gay sexuality as
309. Burns v. McGregor Elecs. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1993)
(stating that the issue is the unwelcomeness of the conduct, not the sexual or
other activities of the plaintiff).
310. Cf Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 139-41 (describing similar behavior by the gay
employees against the non-gay males).
311. See generally, Grose, supra note 214, at 388, 396 (asserting that courts
find harassment by gay perpetrators covered under Title VII, but not by non-
gay perpetrators whose victims are gay).
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opposed to gay sexuality. We recognize and ascribe a wider
range of rationales for non-gay people's behavior than we do
with gay persons' conduct.
Certainly, the treatment Wrightson received was repre-
hensible. The Fourth Circuit may have been correct that it
was attraction-based sexual harassment. Nevertheless, the
flaws in the court's schema of lesbians and gay men caused it
to gloss over significant issues and may have derailed its
analysis.
If some judges are able to fit at least some same-sex, at-
traction-based claims into the cross-sex sexual harassment
paradigm, why do other jurists refuse to do so? The cases
that have held Title VII inapplicable to same-sex sexual har-
assment seem to focus on the harasser's membership in the
same sex as the targeted employee. In Hopkins v. Baltimore
Gas & Electric Company,312 the court stated:
[I]t... seems peculiar to call sexual harassment of a male
by a male, or of a female by a female, sex discrimina-
tion .... What the harasser is really doing is preferring or
selecting some one member of his [own] gender for sexual
attention, however unwelcome that attention may be to its
object. He certainly does not despise the entire group, nor
does he wish to harm its members, since he is a member
himself and finds others of the group sexually attractive.313
Several flaws inhere in the quoted explanation. First,
attraction-based sexual harassment is a form of disparate
treatment; but for the employee's sex, he or she would not
have been among the objects of the harasser's attentions.
It is not necessary to delve into the psychosocial aspects of
sexual harassment, into why the harassment occurs, in order
to link it to other forms of sex discrimination. It stands on its
own bottom.
Second, the argument quoted above is reminiscent of the
original arguments against cross-sex sexual harassment that
have been rejected by the Supreme Court:31 that sexual har-
312. 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996)
313. Id. at 833 (quoting Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp.
1334, 1337 n.1 (D. Wyo. 1993)); Paul, supra note 246, at 351-52.
314. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bar-
nes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v. District of
Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996).
315. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1985) (stating that the
focus of the offense is the unwelcomeness of the harasser's conduct, and not
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assment is not sex discrimination because the harasser does
not denigrate the targeted sex, but rather, finds certain of its
members sexually attractive.316
Finally, this perspective once again imports hostility-
based sexual harassment issues into the attraction-based
context. Hostility-based sexual harassment suits may be
part of a pervasive atmosphere of viewing one sex as infe-
rior."' Nevertheless, Title VII sex discrimination focuses on
the disparate treatment of certain employees based on sex,
not the social dynamics of the workplace. 318 Failure to recog-
nize this distinction has caused some courts to insist that
same-sex, attraction-based, sexual harassment also evidence
the perceived inferiority of the harassed employee's sex. The
forced adherence to a theoretical construct, unnecessary to
the application of current legal rules and developed in the
context of heterosexual feminist philosophy, 1 9 has derailed
these courts from proper analysis of same-sex cases.
Moreover, to the extent that in cross-sex, hostility-based,
sexual harassment suits men may target women because of
hostility toward the female sex, the same may be true of
same-sex sexual harassment where a man selects another
man because of hostility toward, rather than attraction to,
his sex. This situation is the only one in which the fact that
the harasser belongs to the same sex as the victim is rele-
vant-and even then, in only an oblique manner. To the ex-
tent that the hostility-based harassment stems from a belief
that all members of a particular sex are inferior or unwel-
come in the workplace, it is correct to question whether
members of the same sex can logically hold those beliefs.32 °
voluntariness or anything else).
316. E.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork,
J., dissenting, joined by Scalia & Starr, JJ.)
317. See supra notes 259-266 and accompanying text.
318. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.2(b)(1) (1987).
319. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
320. Although, of course, the phenomenon of self-hatred is well recognized.
See, e.g., Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 505 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) ("[Miembers of minority groups frequently respond to discrimination and
prejudice by attempting to disassociate themselves from the group, even to the
point of adopting the majority's negative attitudes towards the minority. Such
behavior occurs with particular frequency among members of minority groups
who have achieved some measure of political success and thereby have gained
some acceptability among the dominant group."); MARY ELLEN GOODMAN, RACE
AWARENESS IN YOUNG CHILDREN, 55-58, 60 (rev. ed. 1964); Specifically De-
signed Programs Focusing on Gay Drug Addicts, NEWSDAY, May 2, 1993, at 69
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None of the same-sex, attraction-based, sexual harassment
cases fall into that scenario. The above quotation illustrates
that failure to distinguish between attraction- and hostility-
based sexual harassment leads to confusion and the inappro-
priate importation of concepts unique to a single class of hos-
tility cases, into a different, attraction-based set of circum-
stances.
Further, if it is illogical to impute a belief that the vic-
tim's sex is inferior when the harasser is also a member of
that sex, that illogic stems from the fact that the harasser
identifies him or herself as part of the same group as the vic-
tim. Harassment of lesbians and gay men, as lesbians or gay
men, is not within that narrow slice of the sexual harassment
spectrum. If the non-gay perpetrator selects the victim be-
cause he or she is a gay male or a lesbian, the shared identity
vanishes along with the logical inconsistency. While the sex
of the victim is not the motivating force, the victim's per-
ceived or actual sexual orientation is. Because anti-gay dis-
crimination is excluded from Title VII protection,' courts
must be precise in their examination of same-sex sexual har-
assment, so as not to reject more victims of sexual harass-
ment than the exclusion demands.
Another possible justification for the asymmetry in
treatment of same-sex and cross-sex sexual harassment re-
lies on the difference gender makes in society. Some courts
that have held Title VII inapplicable to same-sex sexual har-
assment, have adopted this gender asymmetry position.
These courts require a prototypical attraction-based sexual
harassment claim to evidence inferiority or power imbalances
between the sexes. While gender power imbalance theory
may be useful in some contexts, it is not helpful here. In
cross-sex, male on female sexual harassment, the difference
between attraction- and hostility-based harassment is often
blurred. Arguably, even attraction-based behaviors evidence
hostility towards women by viewing them as sexual play-
things first, and not as workplace equals.322 This dual moti-
vation harassment context is the one most relevant to gender
power imbalance theory.
(discussing self-hatred as a reason for alcoholism and drug abuse among gay
people).
321. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 259, 262 and accompanying text.
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However, as the noted feminist scholar, Catharine
MacKinnon, remarked, "the problem with gay harassment is
that it does not involve a difference between the sexes."3 3
Thus, gender power imbalance theory is misplaced in the
context of same-sex sexual harassment. Indeed, the trans-
formation of attraction-based harassment into hostility-based
actions derives much of its power from gender difference.
The theory posits that even attraction-based conduct is
premised on the inferior position of women and the subordi-
nating effect of sexual harassment. Without a gender differ-
ence, as in same-sex situations, there is no intrinsic power
imbalance. Accordingly, courts need to analyze same-sex
sexual harassment differently and maintain, rather than
blur, a clearer analytical distinction between attraction- and
hostility-based conduct.
Much of the confusion in this area can be traced to
Goluszek v. Smith.324 That decision on same-sex sexual har-
assment, and its underlying theory are in error. Anthony
Goluszek was a male employee singled out by his presumably
heterosexual male supervisor and co-workers. They created a
sexually charged workplace in order to intimidate and make
life difficult for a man who had "never been married nor [had]
he lived anywhere but at his mother's home" ' and who came
from an unsophisticated background with little or no sexual
experience."' In Goluszek, a hostility-, not attraction-based,
sexual harassment matter, the court stated that Title VII
was essentially focused on power imbalances in the work-
place.2 7 It held that women suffer discrimination through
harassment because male-domination exploits, degrades, and
makes women inferior because of gender.2 8 Therefore, the
court concluded that Goluszek, a male in a male-dominated
workplace, "may have been harassed 'because' he is a male
but that harassment was not of a kind which created an anti-
323. MacKinnon, supra note 241, at 204.
324. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988). See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N.
Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,
871 F. Supp. 822, 833-34 (D. Md. 1994); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp.
1288, 1295-96 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
325. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. At 1453.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 1456.
328. Id.
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male environment in the workplace."3 9 The court chose to
apply its version of the congressional intent behind Title VII
rather than a "wooden application of the verbal formulations
created by the courts" which would have permitted
Goluszek's claim.3 9
This argument is a variation of the gender power imbal-
ance theory discussed earlier33' and suffers from the same
flaws. The Goluszek court's startling reading of the congres-
sional intent behind Title VII did not come from Congress,3
but from a 1984 student Note and one circuit court case. 333 Al-
though the Note's author recognized same-sex sexual har-
assment, the Note defined sexual harassment "to describe
only harassment of women by men, because the historically
inferior position of women in a male-dominated work-
force.., has resulted in the disproportionate exposure of
women to heterosexual sexual harassment." 34 Thus, the
author had no intention of applying the theory to same-sex
sexual harassment.
Moreover, the Note was written in 1984, prior to the Su-
preme Court's decisions in Meritor and Harris, and the de-
velopment of Title VII jurisprudence on sexual harassment.
It did not address attraction-based sexual harassment, but
attempted to create an alternative theoretical basis for hos-
tile environment-type cases that would allow women to re-
cover for loss of dignity and psychological effects, as well as
for tangible job benefits.3 '5 The Note's gendered power im-
balance theory was prescriptive, rather than descriptive of
contemporaneous cases. 36  The Supreme Court in Harris,
subsequently provided a remedy for these types of abusive
work environment injuries; a remedy that did not depend on
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See supra notes 323 and accompanying text.
332. Indeed, the theory is without foundation in Title VII's legislative his-
tory. Prescott v. Indep. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550 n.5
(M.D. Ala. 1995); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 286-87
(D.D.C. 1995).
333. Id. (citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environ-
ments Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449 (1984); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986)).
334. See Note, supra note 332, at 1449 n.1 (citation omitted).
335. Id. at 1452-53.
336. Id. at 1450 (calling for an innovative judicial approach to abusive envi-
ronment claims, and demonstrating the efficacy of alternatives to the existing
legal regime).
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the gendered power theory.
In addition, the court in Goluszek lifted from the Note,
language of workplace inequality, without comprehending
the gender-specific nature of the argument. 38  There is an
analog to gendered power discrepancy analysis in same-sex
sexual harassment. However, it is inapplicable to attraction-
337. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23(1993).
338. This misunderstanding had significant ramifications for analyzing the
facts of Goluszek itself. See infra notes 452-461 and accompanying text.
One commentator has argued that the power imbalance theory applies to all
types of sexual harassment, male on female, female on male, male on male, and
female on female. Carolyn Grose, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Subverting
the Heterosexist Paradigm of Title VII, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 375, 380-85
(1995). The power imbalance theory posits that sexual harassment is about
male subordination of women and is unique to that relationship. Id. at 382.
Consequently, only the first of these pairings, male on female sexual harass-
ment, is actionable under Title VII. Id. at 385. Under this view, the fact that a
male subordinate can sexually harass a female supervisor, see, e.g., Cronin v.
United Serv. Stations Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 931-32 (M.D. Ala. 1982), does not
vitiate the argument, but reinforces it; the male is always dominant socially,
even if inferior in the workplace. The social power imbalance overcomes work-
place hierarchy. Cf. Grose, supra at 381, 383. This argument draws heavily on
the work of Catharine MacKinnon. See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 107 (1987); Grose, supra at 380-85; MACKINNON, supra
note 241, at 209-10, 235.
While Goluszek and other concurring courts apply a variation of this argu-
ment to bolster their rejection of same-sex sexual harassment, e.g., Goluszek v.
Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (Md. 1994), no court has yet ruled that female
on male sexual harassment is not actionable. Indeed, the Supreme Court,
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)), other lower courts, e.g., Basker-
ville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995); Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977), and the EEOC, EEOC Compl. Man.
(BNA) § 615.2(b)(1) (1987), have recognized that men can be victims of sexual
harassment as well as its perpetrators. Moreover, sexual harassment is analo-
gous to harassment on the basis of race or religion. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66
(collecting cases); Harris, 510 U.S. at 25-26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). But see
Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. at 834 n.21; J. Thorpe, Note, Gender-Based Harassment,
DUKE L.J. 1361, 1378 n.80 (1990). In addition, same race-discrimination vio-
lates Title VII. Walker v. Secretary of the Treasury, 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga.
1989) (light skinned African-American discriminated against dark-skinned Af-
rican-American).
Finally, other courts have flatly rejected the power imbalance theory of
sexual harassment. Prescott v. Indep. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp.
1545, 1550 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp.
1133, 1136-37 (C.D. Ill. 1995). The theory is contrary to the logic of Title VII.
Cf. Mogliefsky v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(CAL. GOVT. CODE § 12940 (West 1992), male on male sexual harassment).
Nevertheless, it provides a mechanism to drive a doctrinal wedge between Title
VII cross-sex sexual harassment precedent and same-sex sexual harassment
circumstances.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
based claims. The appropriate analogy includes hostility-
based harassment.33 s The analysis must consider the gender
relationships among members of the same sex in same-sex
abuses, not wipe them out as the court did in Goluszek.
3 41
In attraction-based, same-sex, sexual harassment claims,
there is obviously no gendered power imbalance between the
sexes, because only one sex is affected. 41  The gendered
power theory is irrelevant to an attraction-based sexual har-
assment cause of action.342 Inferiority or depriving victims of
workplace equality may conceivably be the core of a hostile
environment case, 343 and may create the necessary nexus be-
tween sex and the employer's actions. However, in an attrac-
tion-based sexual harassment cause of action, the connection
between the employer's conduct and sex is direct, but-for cau-
sation. But for the sex of the employee, there would be no
possibility of sexual desire on behalf of the harasser."
One need not return to the days when courts viewed sex-
ual harassment as mere personal peccadilloes of the em-
ployer3 41 to recognize that sometimes sexual attraction is just
that, sexual attraction, and not hidden intimidation or supe-
riority.3 6 Gay or lesbian attraction for members of their own
sex is no more complex or distinct from the attraction of non-
gay women and men for each other.347 But for the sex of the
targeted employee, he or she would not have been within the
class of persons susceptible of harassment. 48
339. See infra notes 401-461 and accompanying text.
340. See infra notes 458-460 and accompanying text.
341. Accord MACKINNON, supra note 241, at 205. However, there may obvi-
ously be non-gendered power dynamics at work, e.g., supervisor-employee, etc.
342. See generally Note, supra note 333; Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798
F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1981). Both the Harvard Law Review Note and Scott con-
cerned hostility-based claims.
343. Scott, 798 F.2d at 213.
344. E.g., Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D. D.C. 1996);
accord Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25-26 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring).
345. E.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz.
1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
346. Or, as Freud is reputed to have said, "Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar."
E.g., Tim Rosaforte, Beyond Two Straight for Kuehne Cigar Craze, TIME, Aug.
19, 1996, at G26.
347. Indeed, gay men view sex as men do generally, and have more in com-
mon with non-gay men than they do with women. See, e.g., CHARLES SIL-
VERSTEIN, MAN TO MAN: GAY COUPLES IN AMERICA, 328-329 (1982); KATE
WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP, 138, 140 (1991).
348. See, e.g., Williams, 916 F. Supp at 7 (female employee sexually harassed
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Perhaps the most striking example of an unthinking ad-
herence to an inapplicable rule, or more specifically, to an in-
appropriate schema 49 in the face of more appropriate cross-
sex precedent, is Myers v. City of El Paso.35 ° Reyna Sanchez,
a female supervisor, made comments about the size of Ve-
ronica Myers's breasts, buttocks, hair and clothing, slid a pen
down Myers's blouse while Myers was on the phone, and
turned Myers around by the hips to open her blazer to "see
what [Myers] had underneath."35 ' If a man had engaged in
Sanchez's behavior, it would have been considered sexual
harassment.352 However, the Myers court merely cited Garcia
v. Elf-Atochem North America... and stated that the rule in
the Fifth Circuit was that Title VII prohibits gender dis-
crimination and not a claim for same-gender discrimination:
"[Tihere [was] no dispute as to the material facts that Myers
is a female, as is her superior, Sanchez. Under Fifth Circuit
law, Myers' claim of sexual harassment must fail."3" While
the court was bound to apply precedent in deciding this mat-
ter,355 the decision as to whether Garcia was applicable
precedent was far from preordained. A little more reflection
might have resulted in a conclusion that Garcia was a hos-
tility-based sexual harassment case, perhaps even between
two heterosexuals, while Myers concerned attraction-based
sexual harassment between a supervisor and a woman she
desired, a situation where the more appropriate precedent
may have been Meritor.56
by female supervisor); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (male employee harassed by male supervisor).
349. See BROWER & NURIUS, supra note 10, at 15.
350. Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
351. Id. at 1547.
352. Compare Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546 (W.D. Tex. 1995),
with Stewart v. Cartessa, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1717 (1990); King v.
Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Gilardi v. Schroeder, 833 F.2d 1226 (7th
Cir. 1987).
353. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1994).
354. Myers, 874 F. Supp. at 1548.
355. WALTER & FAJANS, supra note 7, at 32-33. However, remember that
the court in Pritchett disregarded the same Fifth Circuit precedents in order to
make a gay perpetrator liable for sexual harassment of a non-gay victim.
Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Mgt. Co., 1995 WL 241855, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr.
25, 1995).
356. The fairly unrestricted choice that a judge has in deciding which prece-
dent is applicable to the case before her has been the subject of a long academic
debate. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE & BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 48-54 (1988).
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Garcia hardly deserves the unthinking adherence it has
received from Myers and from other cases. 357 Not only are the
facts vague, but the court's reasoning is virtually non-
existent. Freddie Garcia alleged that on several occasions his
supervisor, Rayford Locke had "reach[ed] around and
grab[bed] [Garcia's] crotch area and ma[de] sexual motions
from behind [Garcia]." 58 Although a woman subjected to this
type of unwanted sexual conduct by her supervisor would
have had a sexual harassment claim,359 the Fifth Circuit re-
jected any finding of liability:
Finally, we held in Giddings v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533 (5th
Cir. Dec. 6, 1993) (unpublished), that "[h]arassment by a male
supervisor against a male subordinate does not state a claim
under Title VII even though the harassment has sexual over-
tones." Accord Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1456 (N.D. Ill.
1988). Title VII addresses gender discrimination. Thus, what
Locke did to Garcia could not in any event constitute sexual
harassment within the purview of Title VII, and hence summary
judgment in favor of all defendants was proper on this basis
also.'0
flexively rejected Title VII liability without any investigation
into relevant cross-sex sexual harassment precedent. Indeed,
as quoted above, the Fifth Circuit merely reiterated what it
had said in an unpublished opinion, without any discussion
of the facts in that case. Further, the court in Garcia distin-
guished gender [read sex] discrimination from same-gender
[read sex] discrimination with merely an oblique reference to
Goluszek.3"' The citation to Goluszek further confused this is-
sue. Goluszek concerned sexual harassment by a male su-
pervisor and other presumably heterosexual employees.362
357. See, e.g., Sarff v. Continental Express, 894 F. Supp. 1076, 1082 (S.D.
Tex. 1995); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D. Tex. 1995);
cf Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. 83 F.3d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3814 (June 9, 1997) (questioning the appropriateness
of Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994), but applying it
anyway).
358. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1994).
359. See, e.g., Anderson v. YARP Restaurant, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
560 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1997).
360. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52 (citations omitted).
361. Id. at 452 (citing Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988),
for the proposition that Title VII addressed gender discrimination only).
362. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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They targeted Goluszek for sexual teasing and innuendo be-
cause of Goluszek's total lack of sexual experience.863 Al-
though this type of sexually charged atmosphere can violate
Title VII, in the context of lesbians and gay men, it calls for a
more refined analysis than is evident in that case and in
Garcia.364
Finally, the facts regarding Garcia's harassment are am-
biguous. The Fifth Circuit mentioned that other employees
had complained of arguably similar actions by Locke, but
that his conduct had been "'viewed as horseplay'65 and was
not alleged to be sexually motivated."366 The court's opinion is
unclear as to who viewed Locke's conduct as horseplay. The
implied subject of the passively voiced sentence seems to be
the two other harassed male employees. Even if viewed as
horseplay, the conduct still involved a form of undesired,
sexually-themed touching. Moreover, the implication of the
court's contrast between horseplay and sexual motive is that
sexual harassment must be based on desire to be actionable.
Accordingly, Garcia blurred the distinction between two dif-
ferent types of same-sex sexual harassment: (1) harassment
based on sexual attraction, where the cross-sex harassment
paradigm is typified by Meritor.67 and (2) harassment based
on sexual hostility and intimidation, where the cross-sex
paradigm is Harris.6 ' The conflation has mislead courts from
the relevant parallels with cross-sex sexual harassment
cases.
Complicating same-sex sexual harassment cases is the
long-standing doctrine that Title VII does not protect against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 69 As in
Pritchett, judges have been quick to seize upon this precedent
363. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1453-54.
364. See infra notes 401-461 and accompanying text.
365. The "boys will be boys" approach to the conduct is reminiscent of early
cross-sex sexual harassment cases. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F.
Supp. 161, 163-64 (D. Ariz. 1975); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236
(N.D. Cal. 1976). That cavalier attitude toward same-sex sexual harassment is
often in sharp contrast to the view of cross-sex sexual harassment. E.g.,
Nabozny v. Podlesny, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 18866, *20-*22 (7th Cir. July 31,
1996) (difference in treatment of those two situations raises an Equal Protec-
tion challenge.)
366. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 448.
367. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.a.
368. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.b.
369. E.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th
Cir. 1979).
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and import it into cases where it does not belong. Just as
the lesbian and gay male schema leads judges to equate gen-
der atypical behavior with homosexuality,37 ° same-sex inter-
action of a sexual nature often transforms a sexual harass-
ment case into a sexual orientation matter, thereby rendering
an actionable instance of sex discrimination beyond the scope
of Title VII.
Because schemas can be contradictory, intersecting in a
myriad of ways, individual cases can evince a number of dif-
ferent schemas. This article has already examined quite a
few ways in which aspects of the lesbian and gay male
schema interacts with sexual harassment prototypes: (1) The
fact that a lesbian or gay male plaintiff is involved provokes
some judges to refuse Title VII relief entirely, reasoning that
any actions taken must have been based on sexual orienta-
tion, not sex. 7' (2) The belief that gay identity is purely sex-
ual behavior divorced from love or fidelity; therefore, homo-
sexual advances against another gay person are rarely
considered to be unwelcome or offensive." (3) The strength
of the prototype sexual harassment schema as male on fe-
male, gendered sexual attraction clouds the ability of some
judges to analyze some same-sex scenarios,37 3 even as it in-
creases the inclusion of others.374
Moreover, the terms of the prototype or schema used,
dictate the resulting categorization or use of analogy. 75 Be-
cause judges measure same-sex sexual harassment claims
against a flawed prototype, they make commensurately
flawed analogies and decisions. Accordingly, many jurists
discount or ignore important distinctions or similarities be-
tween cross-sex and same-sex sexual harassment, because
male on male or female on female sexual harassment does
not conform to their gender power imbalance schema or pro-
totype. We tend to find explanations or precedent in line
with our schemas, in part, because they are the only ones for
which we are looking. 71 We also attempt to interpret the
370. E.g., Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098, 1099 (N.D. Ga.
1975); see also supra notes 182-213 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 182-209 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 284-285 and accompanying text.
375. BROWER & NuRius, supra note 10, at 86.
376. Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
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welter of ambiguous or contradictory information in a man-
ner that makes sense to us, whether or not it is accurate.377
The Fourth Circuit's rather selective reading of the facts of
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America evidences these aspects of
schema theory.
3 78
The District Court opinion Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas &
Elec., illustrates many of the analytical flaws in attraction-
based cases provoked by the inaccuracies of the courts'
schema of lesbians and gay men. George Hopkins alleged
that his supervisor, Ira Swadow, subjected him to a sexually
charged hostile work environment.38 ° Swadow apparently en-
tered the men's room while Hopkins was there alone and pre-
tended to lock the door, saying, "Ah, alone at last."38' Swadow
wrote "S.W.A.K. Kiss, Kiss" (Sealed With A Kiss) on mail
addressed Hopkins, and wrote "Alternate" in front of the
company name "Lifestyles" on another piece of Hopkins's
mail.38 He also put a magnifying glass over plaintiffs crotch,
asking, "Where is it?" and made other sexual innuendoes.383
In reviewing sexual harassment jurisprudence, the dis-
trict court noted that Title VII does not prohibit discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation or transsexualism.3 4
Finding that the Supreme Court in Vinson and Harris did
not address the precise issue before it, the court canvassed
the cases involving same-sex sexual harassment... and con-
cluded that Title VII was inapplicable because it found no
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124-31 (1974); Tversky & Kahneman, Availability: A Heuris-
tic for Judging Frequency Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
377. BROWER & NURIuS, supra note 10, at 86.
378. See supra notes 300-311 and accompanying text.
379. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994),
affd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).
380. Id. at 824.
381. Id. at 825.
382. Id. at 824.
383. Id. at 825.
384. Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. at 832 n.7 (citing inter alia Williamson v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089
(1990) (sexual orientation); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. Inc., 608 F2d 327
(9th Cir. 1979) (same); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1071 (1985) (transsexualism); Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332 at 70,102 (6th Cir. 1992) (assumed homosexuality).
Of course, homosexuality and transsexuality are not coextensive. Ulane, 742
F.2d at 1083 n.3.
385. The court's term is "same-gender," apparently using "sex" and "gender"
interchangeably. Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. at 832.
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congressional intent for its application. 86 Alternatively, the
court found that Swadow's conduct was neither directed at
plaintiff because of his sex, sufficiently severe, nor containing
explicit or implicit demands on him for sexual favors."7
The court's reference to congressional intent is puzzling.
If the court meant that Title VII did not apply because Hop-
kins' alleged sexual orientation claim was not envisioned by
Congress, the court is in error. Homosexuality was not the
basis of Hopkins' cause of action regardless of Title VII's lack
of coverage. The court viewed it as such merely because of
the same-sex sexual interaction foisted on Hopkins. The
court's alternative holding is no less cryptic. If sexual attrac-
tion drove Swadow's behavior, it was directed at plaintiff be-
cause of his sex. The parallels to cross-sex, attraction-based
sexual harassment should have been clear. Perhaps the
court meant to say that the conduct was not sufficiently se-
vere to be actionable, although courts have found liability for
similar male conduct directed at women. 88 To the extent that
the court's view on severity was informed by the belief that
homosexual attentions could not have been unwelcome by a
gay plaintiff, the court employed a false aspect of the lesbian
and gay male schema. 88 Finally, if the court intended to
deny liability because the conduct stemmed from hostility
toward and not attraction to Hopkins, as is more likely the
case, then the court employed an incomplete schema of sex-
ual harassment.8 ° Because its prototype of sexual harass-
ment was flawed, the court inappropriately analyzed the
situation.
b. Hostility-Based Sexual Harassment
Although the line between desire and hostility may be a
fine one,8 1 for Title VII, same-sex sexual harassment juris-
386. Id. at 833-35.
387. Id. at 835. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court on this last
ground. Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 754; Id. at 755 (Wilkinson, Hamilton, JJ., concur-
ring in part). Judge Niemeyer alone would have reversed the district court's
categorical denial of same-sex sexual harassment liability. Id. at 751.
388. See, e.g., Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1994);
Zorn v. Helene Curtis, Inc. 903 F. Supp. 1226 (E.D. Ill., 1995).
389. See supra notes 296-297, 309 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 310-311 and accompanying text; see also infra notes
408-415 and accompanying text.
391. Cf AUGUST STRINDBERG, A MADMAN'S MANIFESTO, Pt. 4, Ch. 10
(Anthony Swerling trans., Univ. of Alabama Press, 1971) ("A hatred was kin-
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prudence, the divide between the two sides is significant.
Where sexual harassment springs from desire, the parallels
to cross-sex sexual harassment are clear; only the coincidence
of the sex of the protagonists is different. That courts some-
times fail to recognize that this factual difference is only
marginally relevant to the legal issues is puzzling only if one
ignores cognitive psychology and the presence of the lesbian
and gay male schema.
Cases evidencing sexual harassment on the basis of hos-
tility or intimidation towards lesbians or gay men, or persons
thought to be lesbians or gay men, are analytically more dif-
ficult. These cases can be divided into two groups: (1) those
situations in which the lesbian and gay male schema masks
the true basis for the discrimination, viz. gender conformity
and sex discrimination, and (2) those in which the basis is
truly sexual orientation or homosexuality per se. In the for-
mer, Title VII should apply; in the latter, it does not, but
should not either.
Because of the impact of the lesbian and gay male
schema, the hostility cases can be difficult to separate cleanly
into the two categories.392 We must carefully examine the
mechanisms of the harassment. Significantly, "because of
sex" does not always imply a specific motivation in cross-sex
sexual harassment suits. A man might sexually harass a
woman because he believes her and all women to be inferior
to him or because he dislikes her personally. The first sce-
nario is sexual harassment, pure and simple.393 The second is
sexual harassment when the form in which the dislike is ex-
pressed is sexual in nature.394
In Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge Co.,"' colleagues strongly
disliked a female automobile sales associate, perceived her to
be stealing clients from other sales personnel, and viewed her
as being overly aggressive. 96 Conduct motivated by those
dled in me, a hatred more fatal than indifference since it constituted the re-
verse of the love which was slipping away thus: I hated her because I loved
her.").
392. See Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332, at 70,102 (6th
Cir. 1992) and accompanying text.
393. See, e.g., A. Sam & Sons Produce Co., 872 F. Supp. at 35-36.
394. See, e.g., Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge Co., 79 F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir.
1996).
395. 79 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1996).
396. Id. at 998. Although aggressiveness was one of the disfavored traits
mentioned in Winsor, the Price Waterhouse cross-gender schema does not ap-
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perceptions falls outside the purview of Title VII. However,
the personal animosity towards plaintiff took the form of a
male employee pinning her against the wall and shoving his
knee between her legs, as well as subjecting her to sexually
explicit epithets.397 The court rejected the employer's claim
that the conduct was solely motivated by personal dislike.398
Rather, the Tenth Circuit found that even if the original mo-
tive of the conduct were gender-neutral, its expression in a
sexually intimidating manner made it discrimination on the
basis of sex.399 Vulgarity and epithets may have different
meanings when directed at women; they become gender spe-
cific, and are a direct affront to women's self-respect.400 The
key to properly understanding these cases is the subliminal
message of dominance sent to, or of inferiority felt by, the
harassment victim.
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors4 °' is
factually parallel to Winsor, yet homosexuality and its role in
same-sex sexual harassment inveigled the Fourth Circuit in
McWilliams."2 Fellow workers sexually abused McWilliams,
a mentally disabled male mechanic working in an all-male
worksite.4 °3 They pushed him to his knees and made him the
victim of simulated oral sex. 4" A co-worker exposed himself
to McWilliams and pulled him toward a bathroom stall.4 9
Unable to resist, employees rubbed McWilliams' penis until it
pear to be at work in this case.
397. Id. at 998-99; accord Quick v. Donaldson, Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th
Cir. 1996) (personal dislike of plaintiff cannot easily excuse sexually-themed
male-male attacks).
398. Winsor, 79 F.3d at 1000.
399. Id.
400. Id. (citing Burns v. McGregor Elecs. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 965 (8th
Cir. 1993); A. Sam & Sons Produce Co., 895 F. Supp. at 35-36; accord Quick, 90
F.3d at 1378 ("The district court also erred in determining that the challenged
conduct was not of a genuine sexual nature and therefore not sexual harass-
ment. The court concluded that neither bagging nor the physical attacks ex-
pressed sexual interest nor involved sexual favors or comments. A worker need
not be propositioned, touched offensively, or harassed by sexual innuendo' in
order to have been sexually harassed, however. Intimidation and hostility may
occur without explicit sexual advances or acts of an explicitly sexual nature.
Moreover physical aggression, violence, or verbal abuse may amount to sexual
harassment." (citations omitted))
401. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
402. Id. at 1195.
403. Id. at 1193.
404. Id.
405. Id.
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4067became erect."' They placed a broomstick up his buttocks.4 7
Although homosexual desire played no apparent part in the
facts of McWilliams, proof of sexual orientation formed the
centerpiece of the disagreement between the majority and the
dissenting opinions in the court of appeals.
The majority ieasoned that same-sex sexual harassment
is only actionable under Title VII when motivated by homo-
sexual desire and that homosexuality of the perpetrator is a
necessary element that the plaintiff must prove.4"8 Taking
cross-sex sexual harassment as the norm, the court assumed
sexual attraction was requisite and present in those cases.4 9
Accordingly, since McWilliams presented no evidence of ho-
mosexual attraction, he had not proven his case.41° Moreover,
because no sexual attraction was present, no cause of action
could lie if the harasser and victim were heterosexuals of the
same sex.41' McWilliams, said the court, was harassed be-
cause of personal animosity due to his limited mental capac-
ity; this type of behavior fell outside Title VII.412
Judge Michael's dissent rejected the proof requirement of
homosexuality, but did not question the requirement of sex-
ual desire."' He stated that any physical abuse of a co-
worker for sexual satisfaction or desire constituted sexual
harassment without proof of homosexuality.414 While correct
as far as it relates to same-sex sexual harassment based on
desire or attraction, the dissent like the majority, failed to
recognize the existence of hostility-based sexual harassment
claims. Because the majority and the dissent's original
schema of sexual harassment was incomplete, they could not
appropriately assess the facts in McWilliams.
A proper sexual harassment paradigm includes both at-
traction- and hostility-based sexual harassment claims. Sex-
ual orientation is relevant only in attraction-based claims,
and then, only as an explanation of the victim selection proc-
406. Id. at 1199 (Michael, J., dissenting).
407. McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1193.
408. Id. at 1195.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1195-96.
411. Id. at 1195 n.5; cf Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 141
(distinguishing McWilliams because Wrightson had alleged his perpetrators
were homosexual).
412. See McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195-96.
413. See id. at 1198 (Michael, J., dissenting).
414. Id.
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ess.415 Heterosexual desire is at the heart of cross-sex attrac-
tion causes of action. Homosexual desire occupies a parallel
place in attraction-based, same-sex sexual harassment.
When the sexual harassment claim is hostility-based, the key
is the gender of the victim in both cross-sex and same-sex
situations, and his or her implied inequality; the sexual ori-
entation of the perpetrator is inconsequential.
The subordination of an individual because of a person's
gender occurs in same-sex sexual harassment as well. Be-
cause the lesbian and gay male schema views gay men as less
manly than non-gay men,416 verbal and physical harassment
of gay men (or men perceived to be gay)417 reinforces tradi-
tional male gender roles. It separates the "non-male" from
the workplace group and stigmatizes him as inferior--the
same process that occurs in male on female sexual harass-
ment. Further, as in Winsor, the original trigger for the har-
assment should be irrelevant to the analysis. Once work-
place animosity has expressed itself in sexual behavior,
sexual harassment has occurred.4"8 The same-sex, or cross-
sex factual construct is of no consequence.
McWilliams illustrates that same-sex physical interac-
tion appears to foster an association with homosexuality
which blinds courts to jusiprudential and precedential real-
ity. McWilliams' degradation at the hands of his fellow em-
415. See supra notes 271-272 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 145-151, and accompanying text.
417. This articles focuses on gay men rather than gay women because the
cases primarily concern males rather than females, and because the lesbian and
gay male schema more strongly associates homosexuality with loss of status
with gay males. See, e.g., Case, supra note 152 at 26-27; SANDRA LIPSITZ BEM,
THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL INEQUALITY,
114 (1993) (describing the harsher treatment of effeminate boys "sissies" than
of masculine girls "tomboys" even among preschool-aged children); cf. Fudge v.
Penthouse Int'l, 840 F.2d 1012, 1016 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding the word "amazon"
not libelous referring to girls. "There is a sufficiently wide spectrum of reason-
able opinion as to what constitutes appropriate gender-related behavior for
schoolgirls that it would be impossible to prove the truth or falsity of the state-
ment that the girls are 'masculine women,"' which was alleged to be a defama-
tory definition of "amazon.").
418. Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996); ac-
cord Quick v. Donaldson, Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The district
court also incorrectly concluded that the alleged harassment was not gender
based because it found that the underlying motive was personal enmity or hoo-
liganism. A hostile work environment is not so easily excused, however. The
fact that Quick might have been unpopular could not justify conduct that oth-
erwise violated Title VII.") (citations omitted).
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ployees may have been ignited by his limited mental capac-
ity, but took the form of an assault on his manhood.419 Sig-
nificantly, this assault on his masculinity manifested itself
through feigned homosexual activity.42 ° Forcing him to re-
ceive a broomstick in his buttocks or pushing him to his
knees to simulate fellatio is a gendered attack on McWil-
liams' manliness.42' The lesbian and gay male schema's equa-
tion of male homosexual conduct with female gender roles
makes this congruence possible. In both feigned sexual acts,
the employees forced McWilliams to take the female role.
Seen in this light, the fact that a harassed employee is gay or
non-gay should be irrelevant. The true basis for the harass-
ment is gender, not sexual orientation or mere crass behav-
ior.
In Dillon v. Frank,422 a male postal employee was ver-
bally and physically harassed by fellow workers. Co-workers
taunted Dillon, inter alia, with statements such as "fag,"
"Dillon sucks dicks," and "Dillon gives head."4 ' Although the
United State Postal Service and the court saw this as sexual
orientation harassment, and thus, non-actionable under Title
VII, Dillon specifically disavowed that foundation for his
claim.424 Analogizing his case to Price Waterhouse, he de-
scribed his cause of action as "sex stereotyping," classifying
certain behavioral characteristics as appropriate for one sex,
but not the other.4 ' Dillon claimed that his co-workers
abused him because they deemed him not macho enough for a
man because he contravened their traditional gender expec-
tations.426 Accordingly, like Ann Hopkins at Price Water-
house, he was a victim of sex stereotyping.
427
The Sixth Circuit rejected both Dillon's analogy and his
analysis:
We find this argument unpersuasive, primarily because he
has not shown that his co-workers would have treated a
419. See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191,
1193 (4th Cir. 1996).
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 91 41,332, at 70,102 (6th Cir.
1992) (not certified for publication).
423. Id. at 70,102.
424. Id. at 70,105.
425. Id. at 70,105 n.3.
426. Id. at 70, 105.
427. Id.
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similarly situated woman any differently. Dillon's argu-
ment must presume that the abuse was either directed at
his supposed homosexuality or at the specific sexual prac-
tices (such as anal sex or fellatio) . Dillon has not shown
such unisexual oppression: he has not argued that a les-
bian would have been accepted at the Center, nor has he
argued that a woman known to engage in the disfavored
sexual practices would have escaped abuse Without such a
showing, his claim to have been discriminated against be-
cause he is a male cannot succeed.428
The court found Dillon's citation of Price Waterhouse to
be similarly inapt:
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins does not direct a different re-
sult. Price Waterhouse was not a hostile environment
case. It involved... [an] allegation "that gender played a
part in a particular employment decision." Because of this
difference... we do not read the Court to mean that any
treatment that could be based on sexual stereotypes would
violate Title VII ....
In our case there is no evidence provided that Dillon's co-
workers justified their outrageous behavior based on, or
accompanied it with remarks indicating, a belief that his
practices would be acceptable in a female but unacceptable
in a male.
Further the Court emphasized the "intolerable and im-
permissible Catch-22" in the stereotyping in that case. A
desirable trait (aggressiveness) was believed to be peculiar
to males. If Hopkins lacked it, she would not be promoted;
if she displayed it, it would not be acceptable. In our case,
Dillon's supposed activities or characteristics simply had
no relevance to the workplace, and did not place him in a
"Catch-22."
Thus, the discussion of sexual stereotyping in Price Wa-
terhouse does not support a holding that discrimination
4C,,429
on account of sex" was involved "in this case.
The court misread Dillon's citation to Price Waterhouse.
He claimed that co-workers' views of appropriate gender
roles influenced their assessment and treatment of him. As
428. Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,333, at 70,102, 70,108-
09 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Porta v. Rollins Envtl. Serv. (NJ), Inc, 654 F. Supp.
1275, 1279 (D.N.J. 1987) (graffiti alleging that "Judy sucks Bernie's dick" part
of sexual harassment claim.)).
429. Id. at 70,108-09.
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was true with Ann Hopkins, gendered schemas provoked the
disparate treatment. Thus, the fact that his claim was for
sexual harassment, and hers was for refusal to promote, is
insignificant. While it was perhaps more obvious that Ms.
Hopkins' partners viewed her as unwomanly,43 ' the particular
verbal abuse heaped on Dillon demonstrates that his co-
workers saw him as unmanly.43 ' Price Waterhouse taught
that gendered schemas generating different treatment of in-
dividuals in the workplace impose a term or condition of em-
ployment that members of the opposite sex do not suffer.
This disparate treatment constitutes sex discrimination. 2
Further, Ms. Hopkins' "Catch-22" may have exacerbated
her predicament, but it is not the sine qua non of her sex dis-
crimination cause of action. Whether or not aggressiveness
or "masculine" characteristics were required for promotion to
partnership, the partners reacted to Ms. Hopkins' possession
of those traits as "unfeminine." The negative reaction formed
the heart of her Title VII claim. The co-workers' imposition
of their versions of gender-appropriate workplace behavior
links Price Waterhouse to Dillon.433 Indeed, the very irrele-
vance of gender-typicality to Dillon's job increases his har-
assment. After all, if Ann Hopkins was truly too abrasive to
be promoted, that characteristic would be a relevant partner-
431
ship criterion. It is hard to believe that the effeminacy of a
male postal worker bears on his job performance. Accord-
ingly, the Sixth Circuit's reliance on the irrelevance of Dil-
lon's assumed behavior in the workplace is misplaced.
More significantly, the Sixth Circuit fundamentally mis-
construes Dillon's legal argument as the court's counter-
examples in the first quote illustrate. In asking whether
Dillon's fellow employees would have treated a similarly
situated female differently, one cannot simply examine the
treatment of lesbians or women who perform fellatio. Natu-
430. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1989).
431. See infra notes 437-444 and accompanying text.
432. Accord Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25-26 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) ("The crucial issue is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions to which members of the other sex are not
exposed.").
433. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 ("As for the legal relevance of sex
stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employ-
ees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
their group .... ).
434. Id. at 252.
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rally, if lesbians working for the Postal Service had been
treated better than gay males, there would have been a clear
case of sex-plus discrimination.435 That was not Dillon's alle-
gation. Since there was no evidence presented as to how the
lesbians working for the Postal Service were, in fact, treated
by their colleagues,"6 we will never be able to assess this
method of proving Dillon's case.
The court more correctly paid attention to the alleged
discrimination; the abusive words: "Dillon sucks dicks."4 7
Nevertheless, it is too simplistic to inquire whether the co-
workers would have harassed a woman in a similar manner
with an abusive phrase like, "Judy sucks Bernie's dick." As
courts have recognized in other sexual harassment cases,
men and women play different roles in American society, and
are sexually harassed in different ways.438 Verbal abuse reg-
isters differently according to the sex of the target.4 9
"Judy sucks Bernie's dick" may constitute sexual har-
assment 44° because it reduces women to sexual beings and
does not view them as workplace equals. 44' However, it does
not connote that Judy is less than a woman or acting inap-
propriately for her gender.442 "Dillon sucks dicks," on the
435. Cf. DeSantis v Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir.
1979) (employer policy that treats alike men and women who prefer sexual
partners of the same sex is not sex discrimination).
436. Although it is fairly safe to assume that they would not have been ac-
cused of fellating men.
437. Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,332, at 70,102 (6th Cir.
1992).
438. The debate surrounding the use of the "reasonable woman" or
"reasonable person" standard in sexual harassment cases is premised on this
distinction. E.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting
the reasonable woman standard).
439. Cf Easton v. Crossl & Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1383 (C.D.
Cal. 1995) (the court contrasts the reactions to a hypothetical conversation
about penis length that takes place between a man and a woman, two men or
two women). See generally Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 1486, 1493-94 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (sexual harassment claim based in part on
pervasiveness of pornographic photos of nude women. A male employee testi-
fied that nude photos of women in the workplace were normal, photos of naked
men "would be queer.").
440. Porta v. Rollins Envtl. Servs. Inc., 654 F. Supp. 1275, 1279 (D. N.J.
1987).
441. FARLEY, supra note 259, at 14-15; see, e.g., EEOC v. A. Sam & Sons
Produce Co., 872 F. Supp. 29, 35 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Winsor v Hinckley Dodge,
Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 1996).
442. Indeed, it may connote the opposite, that women are only good for sex.
Cf A Sam & Sons Produce Co., 872 F. Supp. at 34-36 ("[AIll [women] know how
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other hand, is less a statement describing his possible sexual
activity than a slur on his manhood. Real men are fellated,
they do not perform fellatio.443 Thus, Dillon was separated
from and excoriated by his fellow postal workers because of
maleness, or perceived lack thereof. As the Supreme Court
stated in Price Waterhouse, "we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting
that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group ....
Viewed in this light, Carreno v. International Brother-
bood of Electric Workers,445 illustrates the case of sexual har-
assment of a gay electrician. Plaintiff Carreno, too, was
called "faggot" and "Mary."446  Once again, the equation of
male homosexuality with "femaleness" or cross-gender iden-
tity, forms the core of the gay male schema and the core of
the harassment. This attribution is exhibited by the choice of
verbal epithets. Accordingly, it is not the employee's homo-
sexuality vel non that is the source of the discrimination, but
the rigorous enforcement of traditional male gendered be-
havior in the workplace. As a gay man, Carreno was called
by a woman's name and treated sexually as a female. This
point was also made by the sexual conduct perpetrated on
McWilliams by his co-workers. 4
We need to carefully distinguish discrimination on the
basis of homosexuality from discrimination on the basis of
gender-atypicality. If their fellow workers had truly har-
assed Carreno and Dillon merely because they were gay men
(or assumed to be gay), Title VII would not apply.448 How-
to do [is] flick.").
443. Accord e.g., George Chauncey Jr., Christian Brotherhood or Sexual Per-
version?: Homosexual Identities and the Construction of Sexual Boundaries in
the World War I Era, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY, supra note 70, at 294, 297,
(discussing the selective labeling of men engaged in homosexual activity as
"straight" or "queer" by which sexual and gender role he assumed); C.A. TRIPP,
THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX 125-31 (1987) (discussing ways men deny their ho-
mosexuality, including using the assumption of the male role in homosexual
activity to absolve that individual of homosexuality).
444. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
445. Carreno v. International Bhd. of Elec. Wkrs., Local No. 226, 54 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 81, 81 (D. Kan. 1990).
446. Carreno, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) at 81.
447. See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
448. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.
1979); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1158 (1990).
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ever, Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of gen-
der-typicality through harassment and intimidation.449 Due
to the persistence of the lesbian and gay male schema and its
equation of cross-gender behavior with homosexuality, dis-
tinguishing these two situations appears difficult. Never-
theless, judges must make this distinction in order to accu-
rately enforce the mandates of Title VII's sex discrimination
provisions.
A simple parallel aids in this analysis. In many areas of
the United States, cigar smoking has become fashionable-
even among women."' Assume that a woman smokes cigars
on the job and her co-workers verbally abuse her for doing so.
There may be legal prohibitions against discrimination on the
basis of smoking, and some people may consider smoking
reprehensible conduct.45' Harassment due to anti-smoking
sentiment is unrelated to gender. Even though a woman is
its target, the conduct is not covered by Title VII. If the har-
assment is triggered by a woman smoking cigars; viz. that ci-
gar smoking is considered inappropriate behavior for women,
there is sex discrimination. Anti-smoking sentiments may
exist in the workplace. Nevertheless, if objection to cigar
smoking provokes harassment because it is considered gen-
der-inappropriate behavior, then judges should recognize it
as sex discrimination, even if there are no male cigar smok-
ers in the workplace as comparators. There is a world of dif-
ference, in reality and in legal doctrine, between fellow em-
ployees commenting, "That cigar stinks and so do you" and
"So, are you going to take up spitting and cussing, too?" The
difference is sex discrimination.
Additionally, the same incident of harassment can be in-
tended and/or read differently depending on the sex of the
target. If co-workers made the spitting and cussing comment
to a male cigar smoker, its meaning would be different. It
might be an attack on the offending male employee's crassi-
449. Accord Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
450. See, e.g., Melanie Wells, Tobacco Vogue: Women Fire Up Cigars, Put
'She' in Hedonism, USA TODAY, June 25, 1996, at 1B; Chris West, So This is
Glamorous?, STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER (Springfield, IL), July 7, 1996, at 17;
Anita Creamer, Blowing Smoke in the Demi-Monde, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 8,
1996, at C1.
451. Cf Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1633 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(equating Colorado Amendment 2 with expressing disapproval of other
"reprehensible conduct:" murder, polygamy, cruelty to animals).
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tude or lack of refinement. It would not impugn his mascu-
linity (and could even signify the opposite). Directed at
women, however, the reference to spitting and cussing ma-
ligns her femininity.
As in McWilliams, gay men (Carreno) or assumed gay
men (Dillon) are not the sole targets of this type of sexual
harassment. Recall Anthony Goluszek, the unmarried, easily
blushing mechanic who lived with his mother and was ab-
normally sensitive to comments about sex." 2 The record is
silent as to Goluszek's effeminacy, assumed or actual sexual
orientation."3 It is clear, however, that Goluszek's fellow
workers abused him by impugning his manhood. He was
teased that "his daddy" [a fellow Polish worker] would have
to be called in if Goluszek could not fix machinery.454 He was
told in crude and sexually explicit ways that he needed to
have sexual intercourse with women.455  He was asked
whether he was gay or bisexual, and was poked in the but-
tocks with a stick.5 ' It is unclear whether these last inci-
dents indicated a serious question in the minds of the other
employees regarding Goluszek's sexual orientation or
whether they were simply a logical extension of the belittling
of his manhood.
In either situation, the court correctly stated that
Goluszek was harassed because he was a male and that
similar comments made to women would have been treated
differently by the employer.457 Thus, if the plaintiff had been
a woman, the court would have permitted her Title VII
suit.458 The court's different treatment of these two situations
stemmed from its self-imposed rule of gender domination in
Title VII claims, and from its blindness to gender subordina-
tion where Goluszek himself was concerned. The court ig-
nored the fact that Goluszek illustrated disparate treatment
based upon gender-specific expectations for individual be-
havior, as in Price Waterhouse, and should therefore have
stated a sexual harassment claim under Title VII.
452. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1453 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
453. Id. at 1453-55. Some employees questioned Goluszek about his sexual-
ity. Id. at 1454.
454. Id. at 1453.
455. Id. at 1453-54.
456. Id. at 1454.
457. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
458. Id.
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Had the Goluszek court been more sensitive to the facts
before it, it should have seen the insistence on traditional
gendered behavior in the workplace as evidence of gender
domination/subordination. The court's own language is in-
structive. Goluszek's co-workers "foster[ed] a sense of degra-
dation in the victim by attacking [the victim's] sexuality. 459
"Such severe sexual harassment becomes discriminatory be-
cause it deprives the victim ... of the right to participate in
the workplace on an equal footing with others similarly situ-
ated. '46" The court could have been referring to Goluszek
himself, instead of presenting a counter-example of gender
domination of female employees. That it did not, says more
about the limitations in the court's analysis and the perva-
siveness of the lesbian and gay male schema in that analysis,
than the worth of Goluszek's claim.46'
In the October 1997 term, the Supreme Court will decide
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,462 a male on
male sexual harassment case under Title VII. Although the
facts of Oncale are sketchy, the case may serve as a reminder
of some of the themes of this article. Joseph Oncale worked
as a roustabout on an offshore oil rig and was sexually har-
assed by his supervisor, John Lyons, and two co-workers,
Danny Pippen and Brandon Johnson. He alleged that Pippen
and Johnson held him down while Lyons placed his penis
once on Oncale's neck and once on his arm. Lyons and Pip-
pen threatened Oncale with homosexual rape and Lyons
sodomized Oncale with a bar of soap in Sundowner's shower
while Pippen restrained him. 463 The Fifth Circuit dismissed
Oncale's claim, reluctantly ruling that the law of the circuit,
Garcia v. Elf-Atochem North America,464 denied recovery un-
der Title VII for same-sex sexual harassment.65
Oncale exemplifies the ways in which flawed schemas
can lead to flawed legal doctrine. The schema of lesbians and
459. Id. (citing Note, supra note 333, at 1455).
460. Id. (questioning Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213 (7th
Cir. 1986)).
461. See supra. notes 452-460 and accompanying text.
462. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), en
banc denied, 95 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3814 (Jun. 9,
1997) (No. 96-568).
463. Id. at 118-19.
464. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
465. Oncale, 83 F.3d at 119-20.
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gay men equates gay identity with predatory, indiscriminate
sexual activity. Thus, when gay people perpetrate sexual
harassment based on desire against non-gay persons, the
flawed schema coincides with the facts of these cases. Faced
with this type of unwelcome sexual conduct, many courts ap-
propriately apply Title VII doctrine.
The dominance of this schema has provoked some courts,
notably the Fourth Circuit, to limit same-sex sexual harass-
ment claims under Title VII solely to that scenario. In the
Fourth Circuit, sexually-themed behavior among men is only
actionable if it is attraction-based conduct of a homosexual
nature. Accordingly, in order to prevail, Oncale would have
to show that Lyons and the others were gay, so that the court
would assume they desired him as a sexual object."' Like the
Fourth Circuit, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits would also
grant Oncale relief if he could show homosexual, attraction-
based harassment.467 Both of the latter circuits, however,
have assiduously avoided discussing the possibility of same-
sex sexual harassment without evidence of homosexuality,468
perhaps because their schemas of same-sex sexual harass-
ment were too limited for them to clearly sort through the is-
sues. 469 It is unfortunate for Oncale that the facts of his case
appear to lie outside the narrow scenario where the lesbian
and gay male schema of predatory sex and sexual harass-
ment easily overlap.
Because the Fifth Circuit precedent in Garcia is an ab-
solute bar to relief, there was little need to develop any facts
in Oncale other than the sex of the plaintiff and defen-
dants. 7° Thus, we do not know if Lyons or the others were
sexually attracted to Oncale or acting hostile towards to him,
466. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir.
1996); McWilliams v. Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.4 (4th Cir. 1996).
467. See Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir.
1997); Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997),
petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Aug. 20, 1997) (No. 97-330).
468. See Yeary, 107 F.3d at 448; Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1507.
469. Although both the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits recognized that the Fifth
Circuit rule in Garcia was developed in exactly that situation, those courts
seemed relieved that the facts in the cases before them did not raise those is-
sues. See Yeary, 107 F.3d at 448; Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1507.
470. Accord Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1547, 1548 (W.D. Tex.
1995) ("IT]here [was] no dispute as to the material facts that Myers is a female,
as is her superior, Sanchez. Under Fifth Circuit law, Myers' claim of sexual
harassment must fail.").
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although the conduct in question would appear to favor the
latter. Nor do we have evidence that Oncale's co-workers be-
lieved him to be gay471 or whether they targeted him for har-
assment for some other reason. Nevertheless, given the ex-
treme sexual nature of the behavior in the case, it is unlikely
that a court would deny relief to a woman similarly harassed,
regardless of the motivation. In fact, the Tenth Circuit in
Winsor v. Hinkley Dodge Company expressly held that, even
if the original motivation for cross-sex harassment was gen-
der neutral, its expression in a sexual manner made it sex
discrimination.472 The Eighth Circuit in Quick v. Donaldson
Company correctly stated that sexually-themed behavior
among members of the same sex could also constitute sexual
harassment, even if the motive was personal animosity.473
Since the potential for the lesbian and gay male schema
to skew perception and legal doctrine is so strong, the Su-
preme Court should be mindful of what the facts do and do
not involve. Oncale appears to be a hostility-based, male-
male sexual harassment matter in which the motive for the
harassment does not involve Oncale's sexual orientation.
Thus, the Supreme Court should not be influenced by the dis-
torting effect of anti-gay motive which figured so prominently
in Dillon and Carreno.474 Nor should the Court be misled, on
these facts, to search for a gendered power imbalance, as the
Fifth Circuit apparently did in Garcia,"5 the precedent cited
in Oncale. Rather, the Supreme Court should follow the rea-
soning of the Eighth Circuit and hold that same-sex, sexu-
ally-themed, unwelcome behavior, may constitute sexual
harassment.
471. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir.
1996). Indeed, the word "homosexual" only appears three times in the opinion.
Once as an adjective modifying "rape" describing the threats of male on male
sexual assault, id. at 118, and twice in the court's final footnote within quotes
from other circuit court cases. Id. at 120 n.3.
472. Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996); see
discussion supra notes 359-400 and accompanying text.
473. Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996).
474. See supra notes 422-447 and accompanying text.
475. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) In
Garcia, the citation to Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988) is
cryptic, at best. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 452; see also supra text accompanying notes
294-09.
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V. PRESCRIPTION AND CONCLUSION
Although same-sex sexual harassment is the current
controversy before the Supreme Court, it will certainly not be
the last involving same-sex or gay issues. In the 1997-1998
term, the Court will decide Baker v. General Motors Corpora-
tion,4 76 a Full Faith and Credit clause case with ramifications
for the national recognition of same-sex marriages should
they become legal in one or more states.477 As gay persons
and issues continue to appear in the courts, jurists will be
called on to extend existing jurisprudence to these matters
and people. If history is any guide, the results will be incon-
sistent, at best.
The goal of this article has been to identify and directly
challenge478 inconsistent precedent and doctrine skewed by
flaws inherent in the lesbian and gay male schema. These
challenges not only illustrate that the flawed schema has
warped legal doctrine, but it may create an opportunity for
jurists to reexamine both those schemas and the consequent
jurisprudential conclusions.
Given the power of the lesbian and gay male schema to
distort legal doctrine, we need to modify the schema before
jurisprudence in these areas can change. Schemas are resis-
tant to alteration; contradictory information is often dis-
counted or ignored rather than incorporated.7 9 Moreover, so-
cial science research informs us that mere awareness of the
presence of a schema is insufficient to modify it. Neither good
intentions, nor admonitions not to use preexisting schemas
are adequate.48 ° Awareness and a desire for change are im-
portant, but they are not enough.
Rather, the most opportune time for change appears to
476. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 86 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3644 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1997) (No. 96-653).
477. See, Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: Court Weighs States'
Legal Reciprocity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1997, at A18.
478. Cf. Donald Meichenbaum, Cognitive Behavior Modification, in HELPING
PEOPLE CHANGE, supra note 10, at 346 (discussing the goals of cognitive re-
structuring therapies).
479. But Cf. Karen Farchaus Stein, Complexity of Self-Schema and Re-
sponses to Disconfirming Feedback, 18 COGNITIvE THERAPY AND RESEARCH 161,
161 (1994).
480. See also supra note 10, at 94 (Social science practitioners' schema-
motivated bias not significantly reduced); John Bransford et al., Teaching
Thinking and Problem Solving: Research Foundations, 41 AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGIST 1078 (1986).
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be when the existing schema ceases to function adequately;"'
that is, when the schema does not properly represent factual
circumstances or generate legal outcomes consistent with ap-
propriate precedent. Lesbians and gay men and their advo-
cates can accentuate this disfunctionality by identifying dis-
cordant legal precedent, and by exposing judges and the
public to the variety of gay life counter to the existing
schema.
As courts, commentators and lawyers continue to exam-
ine the effects of the lesbian and gay male schema on law, the
use of analogy may serve as a disconfirming tool to expose er-
roneous legal doctrine. Faced with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, holding that forced ad-
herence to gender typicality for women violated Title VII, a
critically thinking jurist must reexamine his or her beliefs
about how the law should treat effeminate men.482 Similarly,
unwanted sexual behavior towards a female subordinate by
her male superior is equally actionable when the supervisor
is a woman.48' A divorced mother's cohabitation with another
woman is no more relevant to a child custody proceeding
than is her relationship with a male of another race."' By
confronting decision-makers with inconsistent and contradic-
tory precedent, we can assist in the erosion of the functional-
ity of the flawed schema of lesbians and gay men.
Demonstrating the disfunctionality of the lesbian and
gay male schema in legal precedent is only one avenue to
change. The schema itself must stop appearing to properly
encapsulate lesbians and gay men. Legislators and jurists
must have access to examples of gay persons whom they can-
not neatly place within the traditional schema. In addition to
the fact that people frequently discard contradictory informa-
tion inconsistent with their schemas,4 85 another well-known
psychological phenomenon increases the difficulty of this
481. Stein, supra note 430, at 162. As for example, when the high school
valedictorian needs to accommodate her "naturally smart and effortlessly suc-
cessful" self-schema to her mediocre first semester college grades. Id.
482. Compare Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), with Smith
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
483. Compare Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), with Myers
v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
484. Compare Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995), with Palmore
v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
485. BROWER & NuRIus, supra note 10, at 14; e.g., Stein, supra note 430, at
161.
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task. Information that is particularly distinctive, vivid or
significant to the observer tends to be the most accessible for
recall and use. The more typical, socially expected or ac-
cepted the information is, the more readily it recedes in value
and awareness.48 Thus, the most non-normative and atypical
aspects of lesbian and gay male lives are the most striking,
memorable, and most easily incorporated into the schema.
Such aspects reinforce the schema of lesbians and gay men as
different and apart from standard legal responses and exist-
ing precedent and doctrine.
For example, in Nabozny v. Podlesny,48' a gay male high
school student was physically, verbally, and emotionally har-
assed by fellow students because he was gay. The Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court and reinstated Nabozny's
federal equal protection claim that school officials treated his
harassment differently from student harassment of girls in
the district.48 Nabozny claimed that the school district ag-
gressively punished the perpetrators of female harassment,
but told him that, as an openly gay student, he should expect
such treatment, and that "boys will be boys." 89 The idea that
an openly gay student deserves harassment while an openly
non-gay student does not evidences the erroneous belief that
lesbians and gay men are meaningfully different and should
be accorded different treatment; traditional precedent does
not apply. Indeed, the awkwardness of the expression
"openly non-gay""49 to describe the sexuality of other students
486. BROWER & NURIUS, supra note 10, at 88; TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN supra
note 10, at 1124-31.
487. 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
488. Id. at 454-55.
489. Id. at 451-52.
490. The whole question of flaunting, distinguishing between open and not
open gay people runs throughout the relationship of lesbians and gay men to
law. See, e.g., David Cole and William Eskridge, From Hand-Holding to Sod-
omy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 319 (1994) (discussing "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the cur-
rent military policy on the compatibility of homosexuality and the armed serv-
ices). This topic is beyond the scope of this article. See also, S.E.G. v. R.A.G.,
735 S.W.2d 164, 166-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing the activities of a
mother in a lesbian relationship as imposing her sexuality on her children and
the community, and therefore unfit to have custody or visitation). "She [the
mother] has chosen not to make her sexual preference private but invites ac-
knowledgment and imposes her preference upon her children and her commu-
nity"; 142 CONG. REC. S.9986-01, (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (remarks of Sen.
Nickles (R-Okla.), discussing the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, a pro-
posed amendment to the Defense of Marriage Act, see supra note 26). Senator
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illustrates how little we consider the public nature of hetero-
sexuality. It also demonstrates the automatic triggering of
the characteristic "different" within the lesbian and gay male
schema.
This focus on atypicality tends to flatten out the picture
of the diversity of lesbians and gay men and their lives.49'
For example, media depictions of gay pride parades have
usually focused on the more outr6 aspects and personalities
in these events and ignored the less sensational participants
and spectators.9 To some degree, that attention inheres in
the concept of newsworthiness.49 3  However, repeated por-
trayals of this type reinforce an acceptance of the image as
Nickles stated:
I know a lot of people, when they think of gays and lesbians, they think
of individuals they know that are monogamous, and they are great
employees, super people to work with, very productive. I know that.
But there are also a lot of very active people, who work to pursue an
activist agenda, and they would like to use the courts, as they have in
many ways, to pursue their agenda. That is the reason why they are
suing the Boy Scouts. That is the reason why they have sued in the
State of Hawaii. We will talk about that on Tuesday [on the Defense of
Marriage Act], to try to define marriage, and about allowing same-sex
partners.
142 CONG. REC. S.9998-99.
491. The homogenization of gay people's diverse lives into one "gay lifestyle"
is a common error of attribution. See, e.g., Dan Morain, Assembly OKs Bill
Banning Anti-Gay Bias But Rejects Another, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 5, 1997, at A3;
Andrew Barron, Arts Funding in Peril, NEWS & RECORD (GREENSBORO, N.C.),
May 24, 1997, at Al; Aimee Green, No Review of Gay Books-Purchase Is
Called Done Deal;' Librarians Will Field Complaints, SEATTLE TIMES, May 20,
1997, at Bi. Tellingly, courts had once described interracial marriages as a
"lifestyle" to create the same marginalizing effect prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Palmore v. Sidotti. See Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429, 431 (1984)
(citing the Record at 84 where the lower court changed custody from the mother
because "the wife has chosen for herself and her child, a lifestyle unacceptable
to the father and to society.").
492. E.g., MARSHALL KIRK & HUNTER MADSEN, AFTER THE BALL, 195 (1989);
Don Romesburg, Media Watch: Pride Media Round-Up, BAY AREA REPORTER,
July 10, 1997, at 12 (describing Reuters news service coverage sensationalizing
the 1997 San Francisco gay pride parade, as well as describing the depiction of
other pride parades by other media). This had led some gay commentators to
call for restrictions on public behavior and persons which would reinforce nega-
tive perceptions of gay people, Kirk & Madsen, supra at 279, 307-312, and for a
public relations campaign aimed at showing how mainstream gay people are.
Id. at 197-245. That is not my position; rather, gay people should pick and
choose the mechanisms of advocacy, including images, that are best suited to
achieving change.
493. Cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
755 (1985) (appearing to resurrect the "newsworthiness" concepts of Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971)); see also, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 454 (1976).
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genuine.494 Accordingly, lesbians, gay men, and their advo-
cates need to provide judges and other decision-makers with
sufficient counter-examples to the lesbian and gay male
schema to overcome the inertia of extant thought patterns
and to provoke recognition of the lack of functionality in ap-
plying the schema to individual gay people and their cases."'
However, recent work in behavior modification has led
some to the conclusion that the reeducation/communication
model496 of schema and behavioral modulation is most useful
when the subject is highly open and desirous of change. We
can imagine people along a continuum from those most ready
and willing to alter their schemas and conduct to those most
resistant to modification. Reeducation appears to work best
with the former group, seems ineffective at the latter ex-
treme, and provides mixed or short-term results with the
majority of people in the middle.49 '
Thus, some researchers have posited that the uneven re-
sults of the reeducation/communication model stems from
that model's serving the needs of society and its agents with-
out meeting the requirements of the change target. The tar-
get is already manifesting its own perception of its self-
interest through its current schemas and behavior.498 For
most individuals, therefore, it is more effective to appeal to
494. See, e.g., ISAY, supra note 139, at 49 (discussing how one adolescent had
so internalized this image that he did not believe that he was truly gay because
he did not identify himself with that portrayal).
By use of the word "genuine" the author does not mean to imply that lesbi-
ans and gay men are just like non-gay men and women. Many differences do
exist, both within the gay population, and among the groups, gay, non-gay and
bisexual. Moreover, minimizing these differences can be harmful or mislead-
ing. E.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971,
1028-29 (1991); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, 237 (1990).
Nevertheless, in the context of the legal doctrines the article discusses, same-
ness outweighs difference.
495. Other commentators have suggested similar uses for counter-examples
to alter judicial perceptions. Fajer, supra note 2, at 522-23; cf. Lynne Hender-
son, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1638, 1642 (1987) (stating
that the mistake of plaintiffs advocates in Bowers v. Hardwick was to present
Hardwick's case too abstractly, rather than in a manner that would engender
empathy).
496. See, e.g., Michael L. Rothschild, Carrots, Sticks, and Promises: A Con-
ceptual Framework for the Behavior Management of Public Health and Social
Issues (University of Wisconsin, Madison) (unpublished paper, on file with the
Santa Clara Law Review).
497. See generally id.
498. See id.
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their self-interest, to discover what their beliefs or behaviors
contribute to them, and to substitute a different or "better"
product.499 We might then engage in marketing to encourage
the individual to adopt new schemas and replace the old."°9
Schemas provide efficiency in processing information,
and supply shorthand guides to dealing with novel people,
events or situations.' °  Moreover, they allow us to view
events and situations as orderly and rational, rather than as
random occurrences." 2 Therefore, any substitute schema
about lesbians and gay men must, at a minimum, provide
those things. Further, the persistence of counter-factual be-
liefs about gay people, such as the view that all gay people
exhibit gender atypical behavior, or that gay identity is solely
a matter of sexual conduct, may demonstrate that those as-
pects of the lesbian and gay male schema fulfill other needs
in the persons who hold them.0 3 Accordingly, any replace-
ment schema would also have to address these demands.
Like consumer product marketing, the marketing of behavior
or schema change may have to downplay certain interests
and create or strengthen others.0 4 This complexity may ex-
499. See id.
500. Professor Rothschild describes this as social marketing, an exchange
between two or more parties where each is seeking to maximize its own self-
interest while recognizing the need to accommodate the other's self-interest.
Id.
501. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
502. See supra notes 230-231 and accompanying text.
503. Cf Hunter, supra note 227 (arguing that opposition to same-sex mar-
riage stresses the fact that it would undermine male dominant/female passive
roles); see generally, Case supra note 152, at 28-31, 35 n.105-36 n.110
(describing the different societal views of masculine women and feminine men,
and of masculinity and femininity in general).
504. E.g., Leslie Savan, Oh Grow Up-Media, The Sell, VILLAGE VOICE (NY),
July 23, 1996, at 18 (describing the ad campaign of Dewar's scotch as trying to
get the consumer to exchange ideas about scotch drinking with different images
and perceptions). Note also the change in the marketing and perception of ci-
gars from smelly and stodgy standbys for middle-aged men to trendy and cool
accouterments for young people of both sexes. See, e.g., David Brown, Teen
Cigar Use Surprisingly Prevalent; CDC Study Shows 27 Percent of High
Schoolers Smoked One in Past Year, WASHINGTON POST, May 23, 1997, at A3("Nancy Kaufman, an epidemiologist at the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
who conducted the survey, said she believes teenage cigar use is the product of
advertising campaigns whose purpose is to make glamorous and sexy a product
previously associated with middle-aged and elderly men."). Note, too that ci-
gar advertising downplays the associated health risks. See, e.g., Phil Willon,
Cigar Industry a Smoking Issue for Federal Regulators, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Feb.
24, 1997, at 1 (discussing the different regulations on advertising and percep-
tions of cigar and cigarette smoking); Valli Herman, Cigar Chic: Fashion indus-
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plain the slow pace of change on social issues."5 The road to
modifying the lesbian and gay male schema, to lessen its dis-
torting effect on legal doctrine, will be a long one. Such
change cannot be accomplished through rational discussion
and reeducation alone.
Nevertheless, gay visibility has increased with the
Court's recent decision in Romer, 6 Oncale presently before
the Supreme Court, gay rights issues being currently debated
in Congress and state legislatures,5 7 and the presence of gay
and lesbian characters in the popular media.' Such gay
visibility increases the opportunities for change. The fact
that we can debate gay marriage, for example, and that the
concept is comprehensible to us, even if rejected, is a dra-
matic illustration of incipient societal schema modification.0 9
Dissenting in United States v. Virginia,51 Justice Scalia cen-
sured the majority for using hindsight and modern values to
criticize the nineteenth century exclusion of women from
public education. "Close-minded they were - as every age is,
including our own, with regard to matters it cannot guess,
try glamorizes smoking, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 1, 1996, at 1J (discussing
the images associated with cigar smoking and their critics, and quoting a
spokesperson for Saks Fifth Avenue who likened smoking cigars to wearing fur,
"it isn't a debate we take part in, . . . [elveryone has a right to wear fur or not
wear fur, just as everyone has a right to smoke cigars or not smoke cigars.").
505. For example, the change in the schema of marriage to admit interracial
couples may still not be complete. See, e.g., Trosino, supra note 25, at 1, nn.1-3
(discussing recent polls finding that most Americans still disapprove of interra-
cial marriage). However, it is no longer unthinkable, as it once was, nor viewed
as not really a marriage. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
506. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996); see discussion supra Part II.
507. See, e.g., Hawaii Seeks Law to Block Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.18,
1997, at A15; Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup, Court to Weight
States Legal Reciprocity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1997, at A18; Kit Roane, N.J.
Law: Gay Couples and the Law, at Odds Over the Right to Marry, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 1997, at 13NJ7.
508. See, e.g., Caryn James, A Message That's Diminished by the Buildup,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1997, at 35 (discussing the coming out as a lesbian of Ellen
Degeneres and the character she plays on television); Word for Word/The Gay
Nineties: Since Coming Out Is In, A Guide for TV Audiences, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1997, § 4, at 7 (discussing the gay and lesbian characters on television).
509. Some newspapers have begun the practice of running marriage an-
nouncements for gay couples' commitment ceremonies. See, e.g., Hamil Harris,
NOW Protests Post's Policy on Gay Marriage; Paper Declines to Run Some Wed-
ding Notices, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 15, 1997, at D3 (announcements printed
in papers in diverse locations, e.g., Minneapolis, Minnesota, Albany, New York,
San Jose, California, El Paso, Texas, but not in the Washington Post or New
York Times).
510. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
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because it simply does not consider them debatable."511 His
insight is apt; our view of the world may blind us to seeing it
as it really is. By revealing the flawed schema of lesbians
and gay men as well as the distortions of legal doctrine that
occur as a consequence, these matters not only become de-
batable, they become modifiable. While not a complete re-
sponse to these distortions, visibility and debate are a neces-
sary first step to affording a more accurate legal treatment of
lesbians and gay men and to a more consistent jurispru-
dence-so that society no longer makes its gay citizens
strangers to its laws.
511. Id. at 2291 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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